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Since the end of the nineteenth century the economic fortunes of 
the Ivory Coast have depended on a succession of export crops. As along 
other areas of the West African Coast the most important exports in 
1900 were palm oil and kernals. While exports of these products remained 
roughly constant until World Har II, at which time they declined as the 
result of competition in supply from more profitable exports, the impetus 
for growth came from other sources. 
l For about ten years prior to the 
First World Har natural rubber, harvested primarily from wild vines, was 
the most dynamic export, accounting for 45% of the total value of 
Ivoirian exports in 1912, but it was unable to compete with plantation 
rubber from Malaysia and exports virtually ceased by 1914. More important 
for the future of the Ivory Coast were shipments of timber which grew 
rapidly until, in 1929, they accounted for 31% of the total value of exports. 
Following Ghana's expansion by thirty years, exports of cocoa from the 
Ivory Coast grew rapidly during the 1920's to occupy first place, with 37% 
of the total, in 1929. As cocoa's fortunes slowly declined, relatively if 
not absolutely, during the next four decades, coffee became the leader, 
increasing continuously to account for 60% ~fall exports by 1954. But then, 
to come full circle, exports of timber, which had remained static since 1929, 
began to increase rapidly during the 1950 1s and 1960's and had overtaken 
cocoa in relative importance by 1963. 
It is these last three products with which this essay is concerned. 
Together they accounted for 76 percent of the total value of exports in 
&970 ·and for most of .. the 9 percent a~.·or•age anaua:l rate of growth of real 
J· 
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exports over the past 25 years.
2 
Our interest, however, is not just in 
the relative importance of these products but also in the insights provided 
by the ways in which they differ. The production of coffee and cocoa, 
for example, takes place almost entirely on small farms cultivated by 
Africans. The cutting of timber, on the other hand, is accomplished 
primarily by European owned and managed private companies which use rel­
atively capital-intensive techniques and have many of the characteristics 
of mining enclaves.
3 
The type of capital investment required by coffee 
and cocoa on the one hand and by timber on the other also differ. Most 
of the capital which has gone into the creation of coffee and cocoa 
plantations has come from the labor of Africans who have cleared the 
forest, planted their trees, and tended them until after several years 
they begin to bear fruit. It is in the public area that sources of in­
vestment and foreign exchange have been important for the building of 
roads and port facilities. Forestry, a more capital-intensive operation 
to start with, has depended to a much greater extent upon foreign private 
investment for the purchase of trucks and other equipment and for the 
construction of feeder roads leading into the forest from government­
maintained roads. Finally the development of coffee and cocoa exports 
has historically been constrained to a greater degree by demand factors 
than has timber whose main constraints have been those of supply. 
It is the objective of this essay to see in which ways these and other 
differences have been related to factors promoting or inhibiting growth of 
the export sector and of the rest of the economy" For this purpose coffee 
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and cocoa will be treated together since they are produced under similar 
conditions, frequently by the same farmer. In the next section both 
supply and demand conditions as these have affected export growth will be 
discussed within their historical context. Thereafter, an analysis will 
be made of the quantitative impact of that growth on the entire economy. 
Most of the data for that analysis are taken from the period of the 1960's 
for which our quantitative knowledge of the local economy is much greater 
than for earlier periods, Where possible, however, an assessment of the 
implications of our results for the years prior to independence will be 
undertaken. In any case it is believed that the current situation cannot 
be adequately understood without some knowledge of the historical background. 
I, A History of Timber. Cocoa, and Coffee in the Ivory Coast 
A. Supply Conditions 
At the time of colonization by France in the 1890 1s the Ivory Coast 
was to the Europeans a largely unexplored and unknow11 area which had been 
bypassed in favor of more promising centers in Senegal) Ghana or Nigeria. 
It was soon realized, however, that the forest area in the southern part 
of the colony especially was a rich natural resource capable of yielding 
or producing a variety of products. Yet there were a number of things 
which stood in the way of the development of this region. Foremost among 
these was at first the need to establish effective military and political 
control over the countryside to prevent violent conflict and to insure 
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4the safe and free passage of traders. Other bottlenecks included the 
inadequacy of the transpoi-tation network, lack of localized knowledge of 
and experience in tropical agriculture, and the absence of a reliable 
supply of labor. 
Transportati.2.!!:_ One of the most rapidly growing exports, timber, 
though more accessible th,~n in many countries, was nevertheless subject 
to high costs of transportation. For many years the primary means of 
transporting logs was by floating them down the rivers and across the 
lagunes to several ports along the coast. The largest of these was 
Grand Bassam, where logs were lifted out of the water by crane and into 
rail cars which carried them to the wharf extending past the surf where 
they were dumped and floated out to ships at anchor in the roadstead. 
In other areas they had to be rolled for severc!l kilometers across land 
separating the lagunes from the sea and towed out through the heavy sutf. 
In addition to these costly handling operations, loading depended on sea 
conditions, and long delays and high losses were frequent. 
As the railroad was extended in 1903 northward from Abidjan new 
timber concessions tended to be located along this line. 5 It was not 
until 1932, ,however, that the railroad was linked directly with a newly 
constructed wharf at Port Bouet, seven miles from Abidjan. By this time, 
though, the relatively high prices of the J.920zs had given way to the 
depressed condition of the 1930's. 
It was not until after the Second World War that the transportation 
6/constraint was, for a time, eased.- With the opening of the Vridi Canal 
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in 1951 and the construction of a modern deep-water port at Abidjan,costs 
of transporting timber were lowered to such an extent that many areas 
of forest previously unexploitable were now within reach. The result was 
an enormous expansion of production averaging at 16 percent annual rate 
of growth from 1950,to 1970. Timber camps continued to be concentrated 
near the railway and various wate.r1,rre.ysk. for a time since truck transpor­
tation was still relatively expensive and ,-;,as confined to feeding the 
railroad and lagunes. During the 19SO's, however, public roads were sub­
stantially improved. As the areas near the railroad and waterways were 
depleted, the center of production shifted westward, and trucking directly 
to Abidjan became increasingly common. By the late 1960:s, however, 
transportation distances were such that several species ~ere expected to 
be no longer profitable within a few years" The construction of a new 
port at San Pedro in the southwestern part of the country, as part of the 
1971-75 Plan, promised to extend timber production for several years, 
but it was nevertheless clear by 1970 that the frantic 
previous two decades could not long be continued. 
Transportation was less of a bottleneck in the case of coffee and 
cocoa, both of which have a relatively high value in relationship to their 
bulk. Short hauls of relatively small quantitJ~s could be accomplished 
by head porterage and the lagunes and railway provided avenues for longer 
hauls. Still the introduction of the truck and the expansion of the 
road network during the interwar period opened up many new areas to 
production. 
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But it was the falling costs of transportation during the post 
World War II period which truly revolutionized agriculture in the forest 
region of the South. This was especially important after 1954 when the 
high prices received during the first decade following the war were 
sharply decreased. Even though the prices of many transportation inputs 
were rising, rates charged for hauling coffee and cocoa declined as a 
result of increased competition and improved roads. Furthermore, the 
extension of unimproved feeder roads to most villages, sometimes by the 
villagers themselves, eliminated the need for head porterage and greatly 
.., 
increased transportation capacity at that st.age.· 
Agricultural Knowledge. More important in limiting the early exten-
sion of coffee and cocoa production was the lack of knowledge and manage• 
ment skills necessary to grow these crops profitably. The skills required 
for timber cutting were iraported with the Eruopean or African, usually 
Ghanaian, entrepreneurs engaged in that business. But the knowledge re­
quired for successful cash crop production in the Ivory Coast was more 
specific to that region and could not be so easily acquired. 
The first coffee planted in the Ivory Coast was introduced by Euro­
peans in 1881, but many of the early plantations suffered from a lack 
of knowledge of local conditions and poor management, and production re­
mained primarily for domestic use for many years. Cocoa was grown only 
sporadically until promoted aggressively among African plante11:;by the 
colonial government after 1908. In the meantime an experiment station 
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had been established at Bingerville and was conducting research on a 
variety of tropical fruits, trees, coffee, and cocoa as well as _on soil 
structure and other basic agricultural conditions. 8 By the early 1920 1s 
the Ivory Coast was producing cocoa of superior quality which found a 
ready market in France. Led by African planters and under the impetus 
of the expansion of road transportation, production of .cocoa increased 
twelve times from 1920 to 1929. During the 1930 1s, however, the rate of 
expansion of planting decreased because of a decline in world prices 
and insect attacks. Production continued to increase fairly rapidly, 
though, as trees already planted came to maturity. 
During the 1920 1s European planters spread the cultivation of several 
varieties of coffee throughout much of the southern part of the Ivory 
Coast. In 1929 an experiment station concentrating its research on 
robusta coffee was established at Man in the western part of the country. 
With the collapse of cocoa prices during the depression most Europeans 
who had followed the African in planting cocoa now concentrated on coffee, 
especially the gros Indenie variety which had been developed at the 
Bingerville experiment station and which was inferior in quality but 
hardi&V than the other principal variety, robusta. They were followed 
shortly by Africans, who, by 1932, had planted more trees than the 
Europeans. There followed a remarkably continuous rise in the exports 
of Ivoirian coffee from 405 tons in 1929 to 17,960 tons in 1939. 
The technical problems of these crops were, however, by no means 
solved. Most of the varieties of coffee in the Ivory Coast, including 
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gros Indenie, were largely destroyed in 1S49-1950 by tracheomycosis disease. 
Vast areas were replanted with robusta ineac, a variety imported from 
the Belgian Congo by the research center at Bingerville and which was 
resistant to the disease. The replanting program was financed through 
a coffee fund, originally established for purposes of stabilization but 
by this time directed toward aiding production, which received a rebate 
from the coffee export tax. This variety of robusta was less productive 
than previous varieties, however, and could not thrive in some of the dryer 
areas. The search for more productive robusta varieties was continued 
and by the late 1960 1 s these efforts were having results. The 1971-75 
-Plan thus calls for the replanting of most coffee areas with selected 
varieties under intensive cultivation at the same time that the area 
planted to coffee is reduced because of constraints on demand to be dis­
cussed later. 
Although cocoa experienced less severe technical problems than did 
coffee, having largely escaped the swollen shoot disease which devastated 
so much of the cocoa of Ghana, it was not without certain problems. The 
two principal difficulties after World War II were the age of cocoa trees, 
most of which had been planted during the 1920 1s and were well past their 
maximum yields, and the losses in production due to capsid insects. During 
the early 1950 1s these problems were attacked primarily by the provision 
of subsidies for uprooting diseased and planting new selected trees, the 
subsidies coming from a cocoa fund similar to that of coffee, and by the 
spraying of trees against capsids. The subsidies were abandoned in 1959, 
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however, because trees were frequently neglected after planting. The anti­
capsid program nevertheless gained momentum in 1959 and was followed in 
1962 by a program for cocoa regeneration. Both of these have been quite 
successful in raising yields. The 1971-75 Plan calls for future planting 
to be confined to a higher yielding hybrid variety which has been developed 
recently. 
By the time of independence in 1960, it was clear that the Ivory Coast 
had greatly increased its knowledge of agricultural opportunities and its 
research infrastructure necessary to add to that knowledge. 9 Experience 
had been gained in the cultivation of a number of crops over periods of 
up to fifty or more years. The fact that the production statistics for 
coffee hardly show the influence of the crippling effects of tracheomycosis 
attests to the speed w:i.th which the agricultural service was able to in­
troduce a variety immune to the effects of that disease. What was also 
clear in 1960, though, was the lack of knowledge which existed concerning 
rural production in general, especially of food crops, and the lack of 
an effective infrastructure of rural extension services capable of bridging 
the gap between the results of the experiment stations and the practices 
of Ivoirian farmers. 
Labor Supply. The particular mode of production of timber, coffee, 
and cocoa utilized by the 1950's was the result of the available technology 
and the relative endowment of the factors of production. We will distinguish 
four of these factors: highly skilled labor or management, modern capital 
equipment, unskilled labor, and land or natural resources. The first of 
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these inputs, the skills necessary to engage in modern methods of production, 
was very scarce in the Ivory Coast at the beginning of the colonial epoch 
but could be imported from Europe, albeit at a cost at least two times 
that of the same skills in Europe. Modern capital equipment, though equally 
as scaree, could be impoLted more cheaply than skilled manpower because, 
unlike human beings, machinery does not eat and drink imported goods or 
experience a painful change in climate. The last two factors of production 
were available in Africa, but, because of the low population density of 
the Ivory Coast, averaging 12.5 persons per square kilometer in 1965, land 
is more abundant than labor relative to most of the rest of the world. 
The low population densities , characteristic of the Ivory Coast , have 
had several effects on the supply of labor. On one hand, where very 
extensive agricultural techniques were employed, labor requirements in 
terms of man-hours necessary to produce a subsistence level of output 
were likely to be low and very seasonal in nature. l_O This meant that 
there were a relatively large number of m:c1nhn11reo 11"'\l"'l,_,... __....._ ........__.&, u n.a,... t'C.L OVl.1t'-• available during 
the off-season for other types of work. But, since the labor requirements 
necessary to produce for subsistence needs in the traditional sector were 
low, Africans were unlikely to enter the labor force during the busy agri­
cultural season unless the wages paid them were relatively high. The result 
was relatively low-wage labor available on a seasonal basis, but with costs 
to the employer increased due to high turnover rates, and only relatively 
high-wage labor available year around. In addition, low population densities 
meant that costs of transportation e>.nd communication necessary to assemble 
a work force of given size were higher than in a more densely populated 
region. 
From the beginning there were frequent complaints of labor shortages 
on the part of the colonial administration, timber companies, and European 
planters. Wages which were established in the port areas, where a lim­
ited amount of year-around labor was available relatively cheaply,tended 
to be extended to other areas, where the practice of working for wages 
except for short periods was not well established and where a shortage 
of labor therefore resulted. Given the unstable nature of the labor 
force and the belief that Africans were target-income seekers at best, 
European employers were unwilling to at':empt to attract labor by raising 
wages. Instead they put pressure on the administration to provide them 
with adequate labor at low wages. 
One of the chief instruments of the colonial government's cheap labor 
policy was the head ta:c. Since it had to be paid in currency, there was 
an obligation for Africans to obtain some cash income. Where commercial 
opportunities were not available in agriculture this could only be earned 
by working for wages. In addition, the governme~t, which obtained a 
certain amount of involuntary labor for public works projects and military 
service, frequently recruited at the same time for private employers as 
well. There is clear evidence that this recruitment was accomplished only 
wti h a strong e ement o 1 . 111 f compu sion, 
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As African cash crop farming increased during the 1920 1 s and 1930 1 s 
and provided a viable alternative to wage employment, European employers 
found it increasingly difficult to obtain local labor, As a result re­
cruitment shifted to the north, and especially to the Mossi country of 
Upper Volta where population densities were high and where conditions 
were not suitable for commercial farming, The railway in particular was 
useful in transporting these workero southward to the forest. But the 
element of compulsion and the poor pay and working conditions offered by 
Europeans in both Uprer Volta and in the Ivory Coast resulted in a massive 
movement of workers to Ghana where labor was voluntary and wages and con-
12ditions much better.· 
By the late 1930 1A African cash crop farming was beginning to draw 
heavily on the. available J.abor suppl~," As:i.de from the higher wages or 
wage equivalent, workers preferred the greater freedom of hours and methods 
of work. With the coming of Wo::ld WBr II the labor shortage became acute. 
At the same time that demands increased for bearers because of the gasoline 
shortage and for Africans to gather rubber to support the war effort, the 
real value of wages decreased due to the scarcity of imported goods. Forced 
labor recruitment was, as a result, intensified. 
Then in 1946 forced labor policies were abandoned by law throughout 
the French colonial empire. Soon thereafter. the demand for workers increased 
as financing for construction and improvement of roads and the railroad was 
obtained as part of the first postwar French plan, Employers attempted to 
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lure labor by paying transportation costs to the place of employment and 
by raising wages, but, even though consumption goods were again appearing 
on the market, the local labor force was inadequate and high turnover 
rates resu1ted in. h . 13eavy recruitment costs. 
It was natural, then., that European employers should turn toward the 
potential labor pool of Upper Volta: which African planters had been re­
lying upon for several years after the war, Recruitment from this source 
was organized under the Sy4dicat Interprofessionnel pour l'Acheminement 
de la Main-d'oeuvre, whi-:h was suppori:.ed by coffee, cocoa, and banana 
growers and the timber companies and (7hich fi.'1anced the transportation of 
workers to andfrom the forest region of the Ivory Coast. During the 1950 1s 
information spread :rapidly soncerning the op;;iortunities available in the 
Ivory Coast, and, as it did, the spontaneous flow of migrants toward the 
south soon exceeded those :rec:ruitsd centrally for European employers. 14 
By 1965 it was estimated that out of a r,-opulation of 4
7 300,000 there were 
fully 1., 000., 000 Africans ::Ln the Ivo1·y Coast who were either born or had 
at least one parent born outside the country. 
The existence of a large pool of labor with few alternative opportuni• 
ties to earn cash incomes outside the forest region of the Ivory Coast was 
an important factor in permitting the rapid expansion of the economy over 
the past two decades with wages being maintained at a relatively high but 
constant leveL There was a substantial real increase in the legal minimum 
wage during the early 19SO's, as .seen in "!?able 1, but this was brought to a 
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TABLE 1 
Legal Minimum \lage and Cost of Living Index, 1948-70 
Index of 
Index of Real 
Real Value Value of 
of Nonagriculture Agricultural 
Legal Minimum ~-/age (CFAF/hr)a 
b









(1960 = 100) 
Year Zone 1c Zone·1c Zone 2 (1960=100) Col. (1)/col. (4) Col. ( 3 }/Col. ( 4) 
(1) (I) (3) (4) 
1948 5.83 33.6 46.7 
1949 9.37 47.0 53.7 
1950 11.00 51.l 58.1 
1951 12.50 55.6 ~0.5 
1952 15.70 64.2 65.9 
1953 18.15 65.1 75.l 
1954 21.00 18.10 15.30 63.7 88.9 123.0 
1955 21.83 18.83 16.07 6f,. l 89.1 124.6 
1956 26.47 22. 71 19.55 67.7 105.4 147.6 
1957 29.87 24.00 19.55 76.6 105.1 130.7 
1958 33.83 25.17 18.82 93.8 97.2 103.0 
1959 37.00 26.00 19.50 99.5 100.2 100.0 
1960 37.00 26.00 19.50 100.0 100.0 100.0 
1961 40.00 28.00 21.00 110.9 97.2 96.9 
1962 40.00 28.00 21.00 109.3 98.6 98.4 
1963 40.40 28.29 21.21 109.3 99.7 99.4 
1964 42.40 29,75 22.25 110.7 103.5 102t5 
1965 42.40 29.75 22.25 113.8 100,7 100.1 
1966 42.40 29.75 22.25 118.5 96.4 95.8 
1967 42.40 29.75: 22.25 121.2 94.3 93.8 
1968 45.23 23.38 127.8 95.4 93.3 
1969 46.69 24.50 133.3 94.5 93.8 
1970 58.30 28.10 144.8 108.6 99.4 
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Notes for Table 1: 
aSalaires Minima Interprofessione:l.s Garantis. T]hen changed during the
year, a weighted average is given with the weights equal to the proportion of
the year in which each wage rate was in effect. 
bHourly equivalent of the legal daily wage where the working day is
assumed to be eight hours in length. 
CZone 1 is roughly a semicircle centered on Abidjan with a radius of
75 kilomaters; Zone 2 includes all the rest of the forest region. 
dCost-of-living index of a European family in Abidjan for 1948-1960
linked with the cost-of-living index of an African family in Abidjan for 1960-1970. 
Sources: Ivory Coast, Service de la Statistique, Inventaire Economique et 
Social de la Cote d'Ivoi~e, 1947-1958, Abidjan: 1960; Ivory Coast, Direction 
de la Statistique, B0.1lletin Mensuel de Statistique, Abidjan:- - various issues; 
Ivory Coast, Direction de la Statistique, Situation Economique de la Cote d'Ivoire, 
Abidjan: various years. 
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halt in 1956 •..as n result of a decline in coffee and cocoa prices and 
the relative importance politically of the African planter class. From 
this date until 1970 there does not appear to have been any increase in 
real wages in urban ar.ens, and rural wages may actually have declined 
in real terms J though the price :i.ndeY. used here is not very appropriate. 
It elso may b3 argued thet the legal m:i.nimum wage b not a good indicator 
of actual wnges l,)aid, especi.:,lly in the non-modern sector, but independent 
evidence indicates !:.'.,~tnc.1 wages correspond quite closely and may, if any-
It appears, t:1en, that ':Jy the mid-1950 ~ s information concerning 
opportunities ::.r, the southern part ~)f the Ivory Coast had spread rather 
effect:i.vely to the ::~ort:12:r.::l part of that country as well as to Mali and 
Upper Volta. The. result ~ias a ::nass:l.ve migrati.on in search of land or 
wage emplo:r.,1ent. Since economic cor:dit ions .:n these northern areas did 
not change, i.t l:-!:.'._..._/' b3 pres'.1med that the subjective opportunity cost of 
leaving ho::ne to go to the rural ari:eas of the south ivas .... ,...... ,....h1-rT .. i..~.:.~ vuc,u~~ l,..LIW same 
for the 550,000 OX' 30 migrant8 out .s. population of perhaps 8 to 10 million 
in the labor surplus areas, 
At fJ.rst mar:y of these immigrants ~iere able to obtain land relatively 
easily, eith1r ns sharec::oppers or w:L:hout payment of any kind. As the 
good land Wl\A tak0n u1,:: :i.ts value :cose and immigrants were forced to 
settle in less access:l.'bl,~ e.reA.s, Althot•.gh the purchnse of land was possible 
by the ea"t"l:, 1960vs_, iew mi.1;::-ants hafl the necessary cap~.. tal or were able 
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to obtain credit on reasonable terms. At the same time reduced prices 
for coffee and cocoa put pressure on African smallholders to make their 
operations more efficient. One result of all this seems to have been a 
shift from shareholding to the employment of wage laborers on a seasonal 
basis. A large part of the immigrant labor force was thus left essentially 
floating and was apt to return to the regions of origin if employment or 
land was not availablec 
It seems then that the labor markt=!t situation in the rural forest 
area cf the Ivory Coast from 1956 to 1969 may be reasonably characterized 
by a perfectly elastic supply function established at the opportunity cost 
of labor in the countries supplying workers to the Ivory Coast. The 
quantity of labor supplied was determined, on the other hand, solely by 
demand factors. Unemployment, to the extent that it existed, was primarily 
an urban phenomena and concerned the collar class more than 
unskilled labor. Underemployment, :in the sense that the marginal product 
of labor differed markedly between sectors, would not appear to have been 
important in the forest area except seasonally due to the high costs of 
shifting labor between sectors for short periods. 
The evolution of the labor situation had important impl:.i.cations for 
timber, coffee, and cocoa production. Logging, for example, was, in the 
pre-World War I pe;:iod, an artivity engaged in by both European and African 
entrepreneurs. Timber camps were all located very close to waterways or to 
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the railway, and all cutting and hauling of timber to these transportation 
avenues was by hand. Crews were relatively small, there were no impor­
tant economies of scale, and capital requirements were minimum. As the 
most accessible areas were exploited, however, problems of moving timber 
from the felling ereas to waterways or the railr0ad became more severe. 
The Europeans solved this problem by laying down track and transporting 
logs on small flat cars. The g:reate:r capital requirements of this method 
tended to force out African p~oducers, and by the 1920 9s the industry 
was almost solel:· in European 11;,,nds. The shortage of labor and rising 
costs due to ever incrensing ~ranspo~tatio~ requirements resulted in 
continued pressure for the use of more capf.tal intensive techniques. By 
the time the ind,:stry v,:as poised fo:r its g::eat expansion after World War 
II, it was almost completely mecaanized. 
The evolution of coffee and co~::>a farming ,,as very different. From 
the beginning EuropeRn and African methods of p:roduct:i.on differed sub­
stantially. While European pVmtat5.ons used relatively labor intensive 
techniques, African farmers used land extensive methods, which, though 
yields per unit of land were low, nevertheless resulted in a relatively 
high return to labor. Fundamentally, the African farmer was making 
greatest use of the most abundant factor of production while his European 
counterpart made ::elatively less use of land and more of labor, a scarcer 
factor. The European could have used more extensive methods but this would 
have required his operating over a very wide area in order to earn a 
return at least as great as his op~ortunity cost in France. To have done 
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this would have made supervision of his workers very difficult, and good 
supervisory personnel was the. scarcest factor of production. The African 
planter, on the other hand, who was content with a much lower total return, 
operated on a much smalle:.c scale, and could easily supervise his workers 
personally. Furthermore, he hsd access to family labor, available during 
certain seasons at low opportunity cost. 
The nature of the technology was such, furthermore, that it could be 
easily adopted by Af~ci:::an farmer& without special technical skills or 
capital equipment. .;.t :'"s in this impor:::ant respect ::hat coffee and cocoa 
farming differed substantia.lly £:ram timbe:.:· i;,-roduction in wh:1.ch very capital 
intensive techniques coulC:: be used to 1o;ver costs" In another way, too, 
the European was .::; t a r1isc1dvc1nt.qg.:: vis ••a~7fa the African. In case of crop 
failure, the European plantation: w:,.th its depend(~acc 011 purchased inputs, 
was much more vulnerable that, the Air:1.can farmel', who could easily fall back 
on his subsistence production" 
The crisis came after World War IL During the war the European 
planters had been subsidized by the government and prov:i.ded with forced labor. 
After the war these p0licies were abandoned. Planters were forced to raise 
wages and some attempted to intensify their use of capital in the form of 
tractors and other equj_pmentc The:. final blow came, however, in 1949-1950 
when most of the coffee in the Ivory Coast was destroyed by diseese. Although 
European planters had mt::ch greater access to credit than did the Africans, 
few tried to re-estublisb. their plantations, and coffee and cocoa production 
became almost exclusively an African eni:erpri.se. 
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By the time of independence in 1960 the basic characteristics of timber, 
coffee, and cocoa production were well established. The highly mechanized 
timber industry, almost wholly in European hands, was financed privately 
from abroad or out of retained earnings. It was heavily dependent, however, 
on public investment in basic transportation facilities. Coffee and cocoa 
production, on the other hand, was produced primarily on small African 
farms using very lane! extensi\,e techniques. Financial capital was relatively 
unimportant for these enterprises since most continued to grow the bulk of 
their food needs and since little modern equipment was required. The capital 
created on these farms was obtained instead at the expense of leisure or 
non-agricultural activities" Initially., coffee and cocoa farmers were very 
dependent on government investment in transportation and agricultural 
research, but: by the 1960:s, the constraints on this production came in­
creasingly to depend on mark.et conditions abroad and less on supply factors. 
B. Demand Conditions 
The market for Ivory Coast exports has had a varied history. Early 
trade was characterized by the relative unimportance of France both as a 
customer and as a source of imports. This was in part due to the poor 
competitive positfon of French products in West African markets 15 and in 
part because the Ivory Coast by internati.onal treaty generally received 
no tariff preferences from nor granted any to France. 16 Trade relations 
with France were gradually strengthened as e. result of Iicensing during 
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World War I and as the commercial sector became more oligopolistic in 
nature and vertical integration was extended after the war, but the first 
real pressure for closer ties with France came with the depression. Tar-
iffs paid by countries exterior to the Franc Zone 
17 
were increased, quotas 
were extended, and, for certain products, subsidies were paid to compensate 
for lower prices and to stimulate production. In 1936 the international 
treaty exempting the Ivory Coast from preferential duties w.iis abrogated. 
Finally, at the beginning of the second world war exchange controls were 
imposed and exports outside the Franc Zone were prohibited. Except for 
several years during the war Hhen Fre.1ch West Africa joined with the 
allies, the effect of the continuatio~ of exchange and price controls in 
the Franc.Zone as well as in other monetary blocs after the war was to 
cause a greater proportion of trade to be contained within the Zone than 
had been the case prior to the war. After October, 1947, for example, 
exports from the Ivory Coast to France were not subject to control, but 
exports outside the Zone ,1ere subje·:t to licensing and the surrender of 
foreign exchange on unfavorable terms. 
After the devaluation of 1949 export controls were eased, and exports 
of the Ivory Coast to countries other than France began to increase. The 
next decade or so was characterized by a tariff preference system favoring 
French exports within the Franc Zone and by benefits for some colonial 
exports entering France. Export duties on Ivoirian coffee and cocoa were 
raised from 6 percent, established in the prewar period, to 15 percent 
in 1950. They were non~-discrim~.natory in nature, Taxe_s on the export of 
timber, also non-discriminatory, remained at 6 percent and were even reduced 
to 2 percent during the early 1950 1 s when world prices were depressed for 
several years. Imports into both the Ivory Coast and into France paid a 
fiscal duty which was non~discriminatory, while imports from non-Franc 
Zone areas paid a customs duty as well. In addition, Ivoirian coffee 
was effectively protected in the French market by a 20 percent tariff pre­
ference vis-a-vis non-Franc Zone count:cies, 
During the mid-1950 1 s stabilization funds backed by the Fonds 
National de Regularisation des Cour,s des Produits d 10utre-Mer were formed 
in the overseas territori2s, In the Ivory Coast these grew out of sep­
arate coffee and cocoa funds established after the war to stabilize prices 
at controlled levels. These earlier funds were supplied with part of the 
export tax assessed en each crop and were used to stimulate production 
by providing subsidies for planting) research, road construction, agri­
cultural credit, and the use of fertilizers and purchase of equipment. 
In 1950 the objective of stabilization was eliminated, but as prices dropped 
this question arose again~ In 1955 the Caisse 
des Prix du Cafe was created, followed the next year by the establishment 
of a similar find for cocoa, The main purpose of these funds was to 
stabilize the fluctuation of prices received by producers, but a secondary 
goal was to improve marketing techniques. The Caisse de Stabilisation 
des Prix du Cafe, for example; was active in promoting Ivoirian coffee on 
the New York market and also :required coffee to be stocked so as to take 
advantage of the most favorable prices. In addition to any net receipts 
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of stabilization operations, these funds also received a rebate from the 
export tax of 22.38 CFA francs per kilogram of coffee and cocoa. 
In 1959 the drop in the price of robusta coffee, especially :;:0 n• the 
New York market, resulted in the coffee fund using up its reserves and bor­
rowing from the Fonds National. Prices paid to producers of both coffee 
and cocoa were reduced, and, in order to pool the reserves of both funds, 
they were combined in 1962 and later reorganized in 1964 to include the 
stabilization of cotton prices ~ithin a single Caisse de Stablisation et 
de Soutien des Prix des Productions Agricoles. Although the promotion of 
coffee and cocoa production was not an explicit aim of these stabilization 
funds at the time of falling prices in the late 195O's and early 196O's, 
in 1966 the Caisse was explicitly changed with financing measures designed 
to improve productiYity and ouality in cash crop production and to favor 
local processing or transfo1~;na.tion. Part of this financing was direct but 
most was to be accomplished by allocations t0 the general investment budget 
of the government. 
With the formation of the European Economic Community by the Treaty 
of Rome of 1957 the commercial policy linking the Ivory Coast to its Euro­
18 pean markets was substantially modified. In general the tariff preferences 
favoring trade within the Franc Zone were to be dismantled and replaced with 
external tariffs common to the EEC and its associate members. This would have 
of 
the effect of grantin~ members\the French territories in Africa lower pref-
erences but over a larger market. In 2idition the various price support 
schemes for African exports Here to be elimic1ated, and, ir compensation, 
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substantial amounts of aid to these countries were to be channeled through 
the newly created European Development Fund. All this was to be accomplished 
over a twelve year time-table, but the Convention of yaound~, ratified in 
1964, accelerated the process, reducing the ultimate level of common tariff 
preferences and increasing the total amount of aid. To understand the chang­
ing trade patterns of the 1960s and 1970s, however, it is necessary to examine 
each of the three main exports in ~reater detail. 
Timber. Although up until the twentieth century tropical hardwoods 
were not well known and were used primarily for aesthetic purposes, in the 
last seventy years they have increasingly been demanded for a variety of uses 
to replace dwindling supplies of domestic hardwoods in Europe. Even though, 
in the early years as seen in Table 2) France was a relatively unimportant 
customer for Ivoirian timber, 19 the colonial government after World War I 
did undertake to publicize information concerning the various species and 
their potential uses. As a result of this publicity and of expanding demand 
for tropical woods in general, exports increased markedly US1til 1928, con­
tributing to government revenues obtained from an export tax of 16 francs per 
ton. 
Tropical wood exported from her colonies generally had no tariff 
protecti.on in Ft'Encc until the. f :.:pression. At that time tariffs were raised 
on timber impo.;:-t8 in most industrial countries, but France continued to 
admit colonial e:;;ports duty h.,ee. As a I"esult, France, which in 1913 had 
imported only 25% of Ivo5·:--.i.e".'ltimbe1., exports, by 1933 accounted for almost 
70%~ During World War II timber e,~ports were severely handicapped by the 
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TABLE 2 
Quantity of Timber Exported by Destination, Selected Years 
(000s metric tons) 
Other 
Year France Franc Zone U.S.A. U.K. Germany Italy Benelux Other Total 
1896 l 7 8 
1913 10 36 6 52 
1933 29 6 4 3 1 - 43 
1938 35 9 5 10 4 ·9 ,~s 
194.a 21 2 2 '.l - ~5 10 41 
1950 30 2 4 21 21 19 9 106 
1955 72 2 21 1 3g 3 17 15 169 
1960 321 10 30 16 94 62 63 59 596 
1965 518 37 19 111 232 227 ~18 204 1,566 
1969 60-0' · 44 28 136 384 760 315 428 2,695 
Source: See Appendix Table. 
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lack of available ships and it was not until several years after the war 
that the production and commercial organization was again functioning 
smoothly. To assist timber companies to expand production in the postwar 
period the colonial government reduced export taxes, lowered import tariffs 
on equipment, granted a subsidy for the use of the railroad, guaranteed 
loans from commercial banks, and engaged in various other supporting policies 
in addition to the provision of an improved transportation infrastructure. 
The market for Ivoirian timber exports, which during the depression 
was concentrated in France, hec::une much more diversified with the easing of 
controls after World War II, especially in the countries of T-Iestern Europe. 
Even the French market e:{panr!ed as supplies of domestic hardwoods were used 
up. No tariff preferences were granted the overseas territories on the 
French market, and, in any event, they would not have been effective since 
virtually all the French demand for tropical hardwoods was satisfied by 
the overseas territories. A common external tariff of 5·-percent was e.stablished 
for rough timbers by the Rome Treaty but was reduced to zero before being 
actually placed in effect. Previous tariffs on tropical timber were low in 
any case, the highest being that of Italy, 7 percent. In 1964 the United 
Kingdom also eliminated its preferential duty in return for reciprocal treat­
ment for Commonwealth countries. Thus by the mid-1960s no preferences 
existed within the major markets for Ivoirian tropical timber. 
·Despite the relatively low tariffs previously in effect, the growth 
of timber exports to these markets during the 1960s was rapid indeed. The 
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explanation seems to lie less in the effect of tariff reduction than in the 
result of strong increases in demand. Aside from the increases in demand 
due to rising income during this period, the demand for new sources of supply 
of hardwoods increased as existing resources in temperate zone countries 
dwindled. In addition greater information concerning different species was 
available as a result of promotional efforts. This is important because 
there are a wide variety of species, the Ivory Coast expof:t:ing. about''thirty, 
and the market thus tends to be fragmented. For this reason and because it 
is difficult to obtain standardization of quality, expansion of trade depends 
very much on the establishment of close relations between individuals importers 
in fact, most timber cutting companiesand exporters. In the Ivory Coast today, 
belong to large integrated foreign comoanies. 
In spite of rising transportation costs, profitability of timber production 
in the Ivory Coast has been maintained since prices have increased at least as 
rapidly. The major problem for future production has to do instead, with supply 
limitations. The world market today is such that it is profitable to export 
only the most highly valued species, and several of these are in short supply 
in the Ivory Coast. As these are exhausted throughout the world, consumers will 
shift to somewhat less highly valued species, of which the Ivory Coast has 
abundant supplies, but this may take quite some time given the abundant reserves 
of Okoume in Gabon. As a result, although the long-term prospects for timber 
exports from the Ivory Coast are quite favorable? over the shorter term the 
rate of expansion experienced over the past two decades will have to decrease. 
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One possibility for future expansion would involve exporting timber processed 
in one form or another, but that will be treated in more detail later. 
Cocoa. Exports of cocoa were unimportant until about 1910 when they 
began to expand rapidly. During the following decade French consumption grew 
by ovep 50 percent, as world prices for cocoa continued their relative decline, 
and then stabilized during the 1920s. The Ivory Coast in 1911 was granted a 
tariff preference of one-half the French import duty of 104 Francs per 100 
kilograms. At that time this was equivalent to a preference of about 20 percent 
of the C.I.F. value of cocoa imnorts. During the post-World War I period, how-­
ever, inflation reduced the ad valorem equivalent of this nreference despite 
an upward revision accompaning devaluation in 1926. Nevertheless, this tariff 
preference enabled the Ivory Coast to capture 45 percent of the French market 
by 1929. 
By that time, however, virtually all of French imports were being supplied 
by French colonies. Since French consumption remained relatively stagnant during 
the 1930s, the Ivory Coast had to search elsewhere to market its still expanding 
cocoa crops, as can be seen in Table 3. This occurred just as world prices fell 
to about 30 percent of their previous high in 1927 and was an important reason 
for the shift at that time from cocoa to coffee planting. Within the Franc Zone, 
however, Ivoirian cocoa exports enjoyed a price which was substantially above that 
of the world market20 but continued to have to pay one-half the French import duty 
until 1936. During World War II prices received by Ivoirian producers usually 
lagged behind cost increases and only subsidies to European producers kept them 
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TABLE 3 
Quantity of Cocoa Exported by Destination, Selected Years 
(OOOs metric tons) 
Other 
Year France Franc Zone U.S.A. U.K. Germany Italy Benelux Others Total 
1920 l l 
1925 6 6 
1930 18 4 22 
1934 17 9 12 2 2 42 
1939 28 20 3 4 56 
1946 12 12 4 28 
1950 33 4 6 5 2 11 1 61 
1955 19 1 20 7 4 22 2 75 
1960 26 1 13 3 2 11 7 63 
1965 29 1 ;32 15 9 30 10 126 
1970 26 1 21 22 21 47 3 143 
Source: See Appendix Table, 
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in business. After the war exports to France were stimulated by increased demand, 
in part resulting from prices which were kept artificially low. At the same time 
unfavorable exchange rates inhibited exports to oth~r countries until the last of 
several post war devaluations and the relaxation of n:r.ice and exchange controls 
in 1949. 
This occurred just as world cocoa prices were rising rapidly from 21.5 
cents per pound on the New York market in 1949 to 57.8 cents in 1954. The 
reasons for this rise illustrate uell the nredoninant characteristic of the 
international cocoa market: instability of prices due to the effect of fluc­
tuations in weather conditions on the supply of this highly nerishable crop and 
to the long lag between planting and rroduction. As a result of the decline in 
prices over the first two decades of the century, primarily as a result of the 
growth of African 1,roduction, and their continued stagnation until after lforld 
War II, little new planting had taken place since the 1920 1 s. By the early 1950's, 
then, most existing cocoa trees were well advanced in age and many had ceased 
producing altogether. At the same time incomes ~,rere rising rapidly with postwar 
reconstruction, increasing the demand for cocoa. The result was a rapid rise in 
prices until 1955 when newly planted trees started coming into production and 
prices broke. Thereafter, there were a series of oscillations ·due to variations 
in supply as a result of varying weather conditions as modified by speculative 
forces. 
On the whole, however, prices in the period 1960-1967 were considerably 
below those between 1949 and 1955. Furthermore, most"of the 
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world's most suitable areas for cocoa had already been planted so that increases 
in production had to come primarily from increases in yields rather than from 
new planting, and costs were consequently higher at the same time that prices 
were lower. The Ivory Coast, however, was one of the few countries which still 
had good land available for planting during the 1950's and,even on into the 1960's. 
It has thus been well-poised to take advantage of the higher prices experienced 
in recent years. 
The oscillations in cocoa nrices on world markets due primarily to short­
term variations in supply which are difficult to control has been the subject of 
considerable concern. A Cocoa Producers' Alliance has been established a.H!~ng 
countries producing about 75 percent of the world's cocoa in order to keep 
excesses of production from forcing prices dmm in y-:~ars of favorable harvests, 
but it has not 8enerally been successful. The primary nroblem today for the 
Ivory Coast thus remains short-term price instability rather than the long~term 
depression of prices or the expansion of markets at least as rapidly as the
annual 
projected~rate of growth of world consumption of about 2.5 percent over the next 
ten years. The main instrument for dealinp, Hith this short-term instability 
as far as the producer is concerned is the stabilization fund. Since 1966-67 
it has tended to accumulate funds from its cocoa operations but at prices to 
producers lower than those paid during its first years, especially in real terms. 
Although, legally, Ivoirian cocoa benefitted from a 25 percent pref­
erential tariff on the French market, in practice this meant nothing since exports 
by the overseas territories far exceeded French cocoa imports, and French prices 
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corresponded closely to prices elsewhere, as can be seen from Table 4. 
A common external tariff was established at 5.4 percent in 1964 by the 
EEC, thus providing some limited protection, and, as expected, there has 
been a substantial increase of Ivoirian exports to Common Market countries 
other than France. Since almost half of that market is supplied by countries 
which must pay the 5.4 percent tariff, there may be room for a substantial 
enlargement of the Ivory Coast share at the expense primarily of other African 
producers. The preference is slight, however, and the gain correspondingly 
small since all cocoa may be marketed without difficulty at prevailing world 
prices. 
Coffee. In contrast to timber and cocoa, whose principal markets 
have largely been outside of France, exports of coffee from the Ivory Coast 
have received important Fr•ench benefits in the form of direct subsidies and 
a pretected market. Ivoirian coffee exports to France benefitted in the early 
years from a rebate of 78 francs on the import tariff of 136 francs per 100 
kilograms. Although some coffee was exported as early as 1892, most coffee 
was grown for local consumption for many years, the profits from exports not 
being sufficiently great to match alternative activities. But with the 
dramatic decline in cocoa prices in the 193G'·tJ, coffee production increased 
rapidly, almost all of it going to France and Algeria, as seen in Table 5. 
The tariff preference favoring colonial coffee imports was raised in 1933 
to 340.4 francs per 100 kilograms. This was approximately 60 percent of 
the spot price for Brazilian coffee on the New York market. In 1931 a 
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TABLE 4 
Cocoa Prices at Various Points, 1}48-.1969 
(CFAF/Kg)a 
Year 
Producer Price Set 





































































































































Notes: aPrices converted to CFA francs at official exchange rates. 
bPrices established for principal trading season cemmencing in the 
year indicated, arplfod• 11 nu-bascule" at Abidjan until December 1963 and 
thereafter at all purchase points throughout the country. 
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Table 4 continued: 
Sources: Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations, Cacao: 
A R.eview of Current Trends in Production, Price, and Consumption, Commodity 
Series Bulletin No. 27, Rome: 1955; Food and Agricultural Organization of 
the United Nations, Commodity Review, Rome: various years; France, 
Institut National de la Statistique et des Etudes Economques Le Cacao et 
ses D~riv~s dans les Pays de la Zone Franc, Documents et Statistiques No. 36, 
Paris: 1965; France, Institut National de la Statistique et des Etudes 
Economiques, Annuaire Statistique de la France, Paris: various years: Ivory 
Coast, Direction des Etudes de Developpment, Comptes de la Nation, Abidjan: 
various years; International Monetary Fund Surveys of African Economies, 
Vol. 3, Washington, D.C.: 1970. 
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TABLE 5 
Quantity of Coffee Exported by Destination, Selected Years 
French (000s metric tons) 
Speaking 
North Other 
Year France Africa Fr>anc Zone U.S.A. Ger>rnany Italy Benelux Japan Others Total 
1931 1 1 
1935 5 5 
1939 17 1 18 
1946 32 5 37 
1950 44 8 2 54 
1955 53 21., 10 ~ ·.~.,,,~. ' ... .. l 85 
1960 68 2~ 38 1 8 1 5 147 
1965 75 13 2 48 3 14 3 28 186 
1970 79 2 2 76 11 4 13 8 195 
Source: See Appendix Table. 
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system of subsidies to colonial coffee producers was established.anci financed 
from a surcharge on coffee imports into France. Since most of these imports 
came from non-colonial areas, the subsidy was essentially paid for by the 
French consumer. The subsidy, which was 2 francs per kilogram in 1931,
21 
had fallen to .3 francs by 1935. The aim and effect of these measures was 
to stimulate colonial production and enable France to begin to shift her 
imports away from her traditional dependence on Latin America. 
22 
With the institution of exchange controls in 1939 severe limitations 
samewere placed.on coffee imports from outside the Franc Zone at the time 
that ~ous forms of subsidy to producers in the Ivory Coast were again 
increased. Exports of coffee even expanded during the war, though the 
major market shifted from France to the Allies for several years. After the 
war with a continued shortage of foreign exchange Ivory Coast coffee found 
ready market in France. In 1950 the Franc Zone supplied 73 percent ofa 
French imports, and the Ivory Coast accounted for about 40% of these 
colonial exports. 
Just prior to World War II about 40% of the coffee produced in the 
Ivory Coast was robusta, the rest bein~ primarily Gros Indiene. By the 
mid 1950s, however, after tracheomycosis had eliminated virtually all but 
the robusta ineac variety, which was resistent to this disease, Ivory 
Coast production was almost solely concentrated on robusta coffee. Robusta 
time in Uganda and Angola and thus alreadycoffee had been grown for some 
formed part of the world coffee market. Its-'• price was not determined 
independently, however, but rather was established in relation to that of 
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Brazilian arabica coffee, which dominates the world market and is considered 
to be of better quality than robusta for ground coffee. The high prices of 
Brazils in the early 195C 1sresulting from the exhaustion of world coffee stocks 
in 1949 together with Brazilian efforts to hold up the price during the second 
half of that decade resalted in a strong incentive to substitute robustas for 
more expensive coffee. One result was the expansion of the production of 
soluble coffee in which robusta has some distinct advantages and, as seen in 
Table 6, a narrowing of the price differential between Brazils and robusta. 
The most important growth of soluble coffee occurred in the United States, 
and it was to this market that the Ivory Coast turned increasingly from 1954. 
But the expansion of demand for robusta coffee was not limited to the 
soluble coffee market. In France esp•3cially, as a result of the forced shift 
from Latin American sources of supply owing to protective tariffs, quotas, 
and exchange controls, consumers began to develop a taste for Robusta. Al­
though the percentage of robusta used in coffee blends in that country prior 
to the war had been very low, by 1957 fully 71 percent of blended coffee was 
made from robusta. The proportion has increased since then
3 
yet 
·soluble- coffee represented only 12.5 percent of total French coffee 
consumption in 1968. Since most exchange controls had long since been removed, 
tariff preferences were relatively low, no quotas were in effect, and the 
relative price differential between robusta and Latin America coffees on the 
world market was no higher than before the war, it seems reasonable to con­
clude that by 1968 French tastes had been markedly altered in favor of robusta 
coffee. In addition to Fra~ce~ Italy, the Netherlands, and Belgium also 
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TABLE 6 
Prices of Brazilian and Robusta Coffee at Various Points, 1948-1969 
(CFAF/kg)a · ' 
b New New 
Price Set by LeHavre New York York York France 
Producer 
FOB 
Stabilization Unit Ivory Coast Ivory Coast Uganda Santos-. Ivory Coast 
Year. Fund Value Spot Spot Spot Spot Wholesale 
1948 45 n.a. 48 73 55 
1949 67 n.a. 59 102 87 
194 1601950 123 n.a. 154 
209 2401951 153 n.a. 180 
208 2431952 166 185 169 
223 2611953 177 199 183 
303 2711954 192 209 223 
149 2201955 141 148 214 
144 2241956 127 129 220 
166 2191957 138 133 242 
167 160 2661958 115 188 206 
2011959 105 153 171 147 156 245 
127 172 105 110 199 2441960 95 
131 165 101 100 196 2351961 80 
, ,.,,., ,co , n7 , , ,, 
~.......1962 80 .Lvv ..LUU ..I.VI 184 236 
134 153 153 151 l85 2211963 90 
155 194 194 193 253 2621964 90 
166 243 2351965 75 139 170 155 
184 240 2441966 90 167 191 185 
184 205 2531967 90 171 189 184 
186 203 2051968 90 167 190 186 
191 233 2361969 95 169 203 192 
Notes: See Table 4 
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Table 6 continued: 
Sources: Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations, The World 
Coffee Economy, Commodity Bulletin Series No. 33, Rome: 1961; Food and Agricultural 
Organization of the United Nations, Commodity Review, Rome: various years; 
France, Institut National de la Statistique et des Etudes Economiques, Le Cafe 
dans les Pays de la Zone Franc, Documents et Statistiques No. 36, Paris: 1966; 
Pan American Coffee Bureau, Annual Coffee Statistics, New York: various years; 
.. 
Ivory Coast, Direction de la Statistique, Situation Economique de la Cote d'Ivoire, 
~, Abidjan: n.d.; Ivory Coast, Direction des Etudes de Developpement, C~mptes 
de la Nation, Abidjan: various years; International Monetary Fund, Survey of 
African Economies, Vol. 3, Washington, D.C.: 1970. 
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consume substantial quantities of robusta in other than soluble coffee form. 
After World War II coffee imports from the overseas territories benefit­
ted from quotas and a preferential tariff of 20 percent levied by France and 
10 percent levied by Algeria on imports from third countries. This tariff 
applied to virtually all arabica coffee since little of this variety is grown 
within the Franc Zone. The effect of the tariff and quotas was to establish 
a price for a limited quantity of arabica in France which was higher than that 
on the world market. The rest of the demand for coffee in France was satis­
fied by robustas from within the Zont at a price which might be higher but 
could not fall lower than the world price for robusta. Until 1954 the combined 
French and Algerian market was large enough to absorb all Franc Zone robusta 
coffee at prices above those on the world market, but in that year production 
increased substantially and lower relative prices on the French market caused 
Ivory Coast exporters to sell 15 percent of the crop in New York. In order 
to preserve the higher French price du:dnr; the next few years a system of 
licensing known as "jurnelage" was used. This system, one form of which had 
previously been employed for cocoa during the 1930 1s, required exporters to 
ship a certain proportion of their coffee to outside markets. ~forld prices 
continued to fall, however, and the French government agreed in 1959 to 
maintain a support price for coffee·in France and Algeria by fixing quotas 
on imports from Franc Zone countries. 
23 The effect for several years was to 
maintain this price about 60 to 65% higher than the world :price. Returns to 
exporters to different markets were equalized by the Ivorian stabilization 
fund. 
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Associate membership in the European Economic Community has had a 
number of implications for Ivory Coast coffee. The French price support 
scheme had to be dismantled and quotas on foreign exports had to be eliminated. 
In return Ivory Coast exports were admitted to the EEC at a 9.6 percent tariff 
preference beginning in 1964. Since the demand of this market for robusta 
coffee is curr-ently less than the total supply of the Associate Members, a 
means must be found, as in the past, for- diecriminatinp: between this and 
other markets in order to make the tariff effective. This could occur 
through effective cooperation on the part of the various stabilization funds 
which are responsible for marketing. At least until 1970, however, it did 
not appear that the external tariff was fully effective in raising the EEC 
price of coffee above world ma.r•ket levels. Of greater importance than the 
tariff preference, though, has been the amount of aid channeled through 
the European Development Fund during the past decade. 
Between 1958 and 1962 there we:l!!e a series of international coffee 
accords culminating in the International Coffee Agreement of 1962. 
to this agreement the Organisation Afri.cairc et Malgache du Cafe ( OAMCAF) 
was assigned a quota of coffee which could be exported to participating 
consumer countries over each of the next five years. OAMCAF in turn as­
signed the Ivory Coast 5 nercent of this total market. The quota was 
increased to 5.6 percent for the period 1968-73. The result of this agree­
ment has been to help stabilize prices, but it has also created problems of 
surplus disposal for the Ivory Coast. One alternative was to sell surplus 
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coffee outside the countries signing the agreement, but at a substantially 
lower price. Another was to try to limit new planting. In fact, production 
expanded during the early 1960's and the Ivory Coast was fortunate in being 
able to market part of its crop beyond its quota, but within the area of the 
Agreement, because of harvest failure in some countries which were unable 
to fill thier quotas. In 1965, however, the government had to limit new 
plantings and to attempt to stabilize production. Surpluses continued to 
accumulate and during 1967-69, 140,000 tons of coffee were destroyed. It 
is anticipated that about 212,000 tons may be marketed within the agreement 
in 1972-73 and that the Ivoirian quota will be exten&ed at the rate of about 
2.2 percent annually from that date. Further increases in exports must find 
new markets, in Japan or Eastern Europe perhaps. 
II. The Postwar Record 
During the past 25 years great changes have taken place in the Ivory 
Coast economy, many of which havG been the result of th0 rapid growth of 
production and export of timbers cocoa; and coffee. 
is timber which has gravm most rapidly during these years, followed by cocoa 
and then by coffee. A quantity index of exports, of which timber, cocoa, 
and coffee comprised about 80 percent of the total value over the entire 
period, increased at an average annual rate of 8.5 percent. During the same 
period, if we neglect the immediate postwar shortage years, the terms of trade, 
while varying, did not indicate any clear long term trend. Thus the purchasing 
power of exports has bee~ maintained. 
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Table 7 
Timber, Cocoa, and Coffee Exports, Quantity Index of Exports, 
and the Terms of Trade, Selected Years 
(Quantities in 000s Metric Tons) 
Quantity Terms 
Timber Cocoa Coffee Index of Trade 
%Value Quantity • % Value Quantity % Value ( 1953=100) (1953=100)Year Quantity 
1947 49 4.9 28 19.0 43 55.8 61 28.8 
48.4 100 86.51950 106 4. 2 62 34.l 54 
3.6 53 32.3 88 62.0 110 136.71954 1$2 
63 43.2 105 47.3 149 105.31959 444 11.9 
143 39.6 250 81.01962 915 19.4 101 22.1 
339 ss.·s1964 1,526 23.9 124 19.5 204 42.5 
1965 l,566 26.9 126 15.9 186 37.8 345 
76.2 
1967 ls840 27.1 105 17.2 149 31.6 343 
89.9 
25.5 435 102.91969 2,695 29.7 119 22.2 178 
Sources: Appexdix Table and data from the author's forthcominp; book on the economy of 
the Ivory Coast. 
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This postwar experience of growth reflects the supply and demand 
characteristics just discussed. Timber exports, constrained primarily by 
an insufficient transportation infrastructure prior to World War II, have 
expanded rapidly as this deficiency has been remedied since the war. Cocoa 
production, after having been slowed by the low prices of the depression and 
wartime difficulties of marketing, responded rapidly to rising prices during 
the first ten years of the postwar period but later leveled off after a lag 
of several years following the drop in prices in 1955. The production of 
coffee, which had grown more rapidly than cocoa during the depression and 
war, also increased swiftly in the early postwar years but began to decline 
in relative importance by the mid-1%0s. 
The export growth record only gives part of the picture, however, 
since it does not include that part of production which is sold to precessing 
firms to be later exported or used domestically. Historically, domestic 
sales of timber have been much more important as a percentage of total production, 
as seen in Table 8, then have domestic sales of either cocoa or coffee. In 
recent years, however, domestic sales of cocon have increased considerably 
as~ rising proportion of that product has been processed prior to export. 
These forward linkages and their effects will be examined in more detail 
below. 
The impressive record of export growth achieved by the Ivory Coast 
during the postwar period has been accompanied by an equally impressive over• 
all economic performance. Although data with which to examine this experience 
for the l950'sai-e very limited, there do exist reasonably good estimates of 
Table 8 
Prioduction and Domestic Sales of Timberi, Cocoa :,..1-,·· 
and Coffee, 1954-1967 Coffee
Timber Cocoa DomesticJoncstic
Production Domestic Sales Production Sales Productio11 Sales 
. a Value ~ue ValueQuantit~ Value Quantit~ Value Quantity Value Millions Quantity a (Millions (MillionsYear (OOOs m) (Million CFAF) (OOOs m) (Million CFAF) (OOOs tons) (Million CFAF) CFAF) (600s tons) CFAF) CFAF) ! 
1954 292 n.a. 123 n.a. 75 n.a. - n.a. n.a. n.a.
1955 358 n.a. 149 n.a. 71 n.a. - _9J n.a. ·n.a.
1956 442 H' n.a. 167 n.a. 73 n.a. - n.a. n.a.lJ/t
1957 407 n.a. 172 n.a. 45 n.a. - 108 n.a. n.a.
1958 657 n.a. 190 n.a. 56 n.a. - 104 n.a. n.a.
1959 767 n.a. 209 n.a. 62 n.a. - 153 n.a. n.a.
1960 1,060 6,504(!
+ 
220 468 85 10,948 - 137 18,221 17., 1961 1,260 8,454 260 5;,l 91 8,875 - 172 21,972 23
1962 1,450 9,179 295 744 83 9,190 - 117 16,350 82
1963 1,810 12,293 330 874 99 11,221 - 215 27,805 117
1964 2,270 17,140 410 1,158 133 14,724 40 241 37,lll 133
1965 2,605 16,709 700 1,721 115 9,283 772 213 27,439 130
1966· 2,600 16,734 778 1, 9_00 163 14,158 1,072 256 31,888 145
1967 3,022 19,963 850 2,125 129 14,859 2,023 157 24,. 732 190 
Notes: 
aPrior to 1960 data apply to the trading season for which most of production is marketed in the year indicated.
From 1960 data arie on a cal€ndar year basis. Exces3 of production over rbmestic Sales will differ from exports,
given elsewhere, because of changes in stocks and differences in the time of recording. 
ASources: Ivory Coast, Service de la Statistique, Inventaire Economique et Social de la,. Cote d'Ivoire, 1947-19~~Abidjan: 1960; Ivory Coast, Direction de la Statistique, Situation Economique de la Cote d'Ivoire, Abidjan:
various years; Ivory Coast, Direction des Etudes de Developpement, Comptes de la Natio~, Abidjan: various years 
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24the national 2ccounts for the 1960s. From 1960 to 1967 Gross Domestic 
Product in the Ivory Coast rose at an average annual rate in real terms of 
about 7 percent. On a per capita basis this amounted to close to a 4 per­
cent annual rate of growth. At the same time a fundamental restructuring 
of the economy was taking place with the proportion of primary production 
in GDP decreasing from 49 percent to 38 percent while that of the output 
of the secondary sector increased from 27 percent to 42 percent. Most of 
this expansion of industry was concentrated in the production of energy, 
construction, and manufacturing of previously imported goods, the last 
sector being assisted by substantial private capitcl inflows. Nevertheless, 
a large part of the growth of real investment at an annual rate of 10.5 
percent was financed by do~estic savings, the savings ratio averagoing 
between 15 and 16 percent of GDP during most of the period. In the foreign 
trade sector real exports increased at almost an 8 percent annual rate of 
growth, maint2ining a large and continuously favor:1ble balance of trade, 
which was used to finance much of the growth in repatriated profits and 
remittances sent abroad by workers. 
During this period the Ivoirian government favored an increase 
in the diversification of agriculture and a program of industrialization 
concentrated on import substituting industries, and, to a lesser extent, 
on export processing. The first objective was to be reached by expanding 
agricultural research and a variety of programs designed to reach the 
farmer. Among the more important crops with which some degree of diver­
sification had been achieved by the late 1960s were palm products,bananas, 
pineapples, rice, and cotton. In the manufacturing sector the major means 
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of attracting foreign capital was the formulation of a rather liberal 
investment incentive scheme as well as the absence of restrictions 6n 
the repatriation of profits. These policies, together with the expanding 
Ivoirian market, resulted in a very rapid growth of this sector during 
the 1960s. 
III. The Direct Contribution to National Income and Employment 
In evaluating the direct contribution of timber, cocoa, and coffee 
production to the national income of the Ivory Coast, an assessment must 
be made of the opportunity cost of each factor of production, for, ideally, 
this contribution should be measured net of these opportunity costs. Where 
the industry is relatively small, the concept seems clear, the opportunity 
cost of an input being equal to the cost of using that input in its next most 
profitable employment. But where the industry is very large in relation to 
the rest of the economy, some ambiguities arise. To understand this it is 
useful to look separately at timber and at coffee and cocoa. 
Although timber in the late 1960s accounted for about one-quarter 
of the total value of exports, its impact on factor markets was slight. 
Skilled labor and private capital, for example, could be imported from 
Europe or from other African countries at fixed prices and helped to earn 
quickly the foreign exchange needed to pay for them. 
25 
Unskilled labor 
was also 2.vailable at a relatively constant ,;rage from either- within the 
Ivory Coast or fr~rn the countries to the north. Since the timber industry 
in the mid-1960s probably employed less than 10,000 out of a total of 
over 500,000 workers immigating from the north, the effect of that industry 
on the wage level is likely to have been minimal. 
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The major constraint on the expansion of timber production during 
this period, as we have said, was the availability of public transportation 
infrastructure. Construction of these facilities, in turn, constrainedwas 
ultimately by the provision of French public capital and by the rate at which 
the government was able to plan and execute transportation projects. The 
effect of this investment was to lower transportation costs to the port and 
thus raise the economic rental value of land not previously served by public 
roads. The government, in turn, siphoned off much of this rent with an array 
of taxes imposed on timber companies, though_some of the rent probably went to 
companies able to gain more favorable geographical positions without paying 
h • h 26ig er taxes. In the strictest sense of the word,.of course, the timber 
reserves opened up to exploitation did have an opportunity cost, that is 
the return which could have been received by waiting and cutting the timber 
at a later date when prices might have been higher and the technology more 
efficient. The choice depended on the use to which acquired rents were put, 
a matter which will be considered below. 
It is somewhat more difficult to evaluate conceptually the oppor­
tunity cost of factors used in productive activities that dominate the 
entire economy. Such is the case with cocoa and coffee, which, though 
competing with each other for land, labor and capital in some areas, if 
taken together employ factors whose alternative uses would not appear to 
be nearly as profitable. Even some of the intermediate inputs, such as 
transportation services, would earn a much lower retU!"n in the absence 
of cocoa and coffee. This presupposes, however, that agricultural research 
would not have discovered some other equally profitable crop, an assumption 
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which does not seem justifiable-given the long history of research in the 
Ivory Coast. 
It seems preferable~ instead, to consider the opportunity cost of 
factor inputs at the margin of their use today. Since a very large 
amount of employed labor originates from outside the country and since rural 
surveys indicate that agricultural wages during the busy season are above 
the legal minimum wage, it is reasonable to suppose that the rural wage rate 
is determined by market forces and that the opportunity cost of labor at the 
margin is equal to that wage. Family members working fields near their homes 
may be willing to work for less, but since it pays to expand production further 
by employing labor from outside at higher w3ges, these family workers implicit­
ly earn rents to their more advantageous position adjacent to areas of prod­
uction. On the other hand, there is evidence that younger people from the 
cocoa and coffee producing areas, •. a:&e. more likely than their 
northern counterparts to go to school for a few years and then migrate to 
the cities in search of white-collar jobs. They, in effect, consider their 
opportunity cost to be higher than the Nages paid in agriic.nlt:ll'l"A- On h;:il:=m,....,,, 
the most reasonable alternative is to evaluate the social opportunity cost 
of labor at the wage rate of rural workers and to assume, for reasons stated 
earlier, that the supply of labor is perfectly elastic at that wage. 
The opportunity cost of purchased inputs is also approximately 
equal to the price paid for those inputs. Private capital used in cocoa 
and coffee production, unlike that employed in the cutting of timber, is 
not imported from abroad but is made from labor used to clear land and to 
plant and care for trees until they enter production. The opportunity 
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cost of this capital is the cost of the labor used in its creation. Unlike 
imported foreign capital, however, the supply of local capital in rural areas 
is not perfectly elastic. A large part of this capital is saved out of 
agricultural income and is likely to be a positive function of its rate of 
return at the extensive margin of production where economic rents to land 
are zero. When financial capital is not available for hiring workers to 
extend cocoa and coffee production, it can be created out of family labor 
reallocated from leisure or other productive activities. Because of this 
and the fact that agricultural incomes were growing rapidly, the supply of 
capital was probably quite elastic.-during this period. 
Lack of agricultural knowledge, which in the past had been a severe 
constraint on production, did not act to limit the expansion of cocoa and 
coffee during the 1950s and 1960s. The particular varieties planted during 
these decades had~ by this time, established their supremacy-~in.cocoa very 
early, in coffee only with the outbreak of tracheomycosis in 1949. The 
major constraint seems to have been a combination of public investment in 
transportation, especially feeder roads, and the vagaries of the 
national market as influenced by government policies. As in the case of 
timber, the combination of infrastructure and policies, given world prices, 
the available technology, and the ret~ns to capital and labor, determined 
the rent to land and tho division of that rent between the government and 
the farmer. Again, the opportunity cost of land should be considered in 
relation to the possibility of postponing this period of rapid growth of 
what Myint has called the "vent-for-surplus" variety,
27 
but the net gains 




It is possible to estimate quantitatively the returns to the various 
factors, as well as payments for inputs of goods and services, used in the 
production of timber, coffee and cocoa. These estimates were made on 
the basis of data published in the national accounts and of the results of 
extensive surveys of the timber industry and of the main cocoa and coffee 
producing regions conducted during the period 1962-1966. Details of the 
estimation proceedures are contained in the notes to the tables which follow, 
but several comments are appropriate here. First, because of wide variations 
in the value of production of cocoa and coffee due to weather and fluctuating 
prices, estimates have been calculated for each of the years 1960 through 
1967 even though this required making a number of somewhat arbitrary assump­
tions. It was presumed, for instance, that the inputs of materials, services, 
labor and capital varied in direct proportion either to the area planted or 
to the quantity produced. This assumption seems reasonable given the relative 
constancy of the prices of these inputs and : the fact that no substantial 
increases in either yields or labor productivity appear to have taken place 
over the period. For timber it was assumed that the size of the capital 
stock varied in proportion to the number of cubic meters produced. Secondly, 
in order to treat the timber and the cocoa and coffee sectors on a compara­
ble basis, commercial margins and taxes paid by traders after the purchase 
of cocoa and coffee from producers were added to intermediate inputs of 
services and to value added respectively. Finally, all labor input was 
valued at 200 francs per day, an approximate average of rates obtained from 
29rural surveys for the busy agricultural season. Given an acknowledged 
margin of error in the estimation of this wage of perhaps 10 percent, the 
-~-
slow rate of inflation, and the uncertainty regarding trends in real or 
nominal rural wages during the period, the wage rate was assumed to remain 
constant over the entire eight years. 
Estimates for the value of intermediate inputs and value added 
divided into labor costs, payments to government, and a residual are 
given in Tables 9 and 10. One of the first things to note is that the 
value of intermediate inputs used in the production of timber is nearly 
twice that employed in cocoa and coffee. If transportation services 
were excluded from the latter sector, the contrast would be much greater. 
The low value of these inputs in cocoa and coffee production reflects the 
relatively simple technology and low yields characteristic of these 
activities. 
Although the absolute value of the returns to labor in cocoa 
and coffee production is three to four times that in the production of 
timber, the relative share of labor in value added, averaging 38 percent 
for timber, do not much differ. There is, however, substantial year to 
year- variation in this share~ Paym~n+~ +n government, on the other 
hand, differ substantially between these activities, both absolutely 
and as a share of value added. Rising from 19 percent of value added 
in 1960, payments by the timber industry averaged 31 percent from 1962 
to 1967. The combination of export taxes on cocoa and coffee and op­
erations of the stabilization fund resulted in wide variation in pay­
ments to government from this source because of fluctuations in weather, 
international prices, tax rates, and prices paid to the:Eroducer, but 
the average share of value added was 22 percent, substantially less 
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Table 9 
Distribution of the Value of Intermediate Inputs and of Value 
added in the Timber Industry, 1960-1967 
1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 
Expenditures (millions CFAF) 
Value of Intermediate Inputs 2,938 























Construction Materials 7 5 27 36 49 63 65 80 
Chemical 18 15 11 15 21 13 17 28 
Vehicles and Repair 















Tires 152 174 161 215 299 317 320 240 
Other Industrial products 4 4 17 23 33 50 72 56 



















Other Ser-vices 26 34 58 78 U08 262 219 341 
Value Added 3,566 4,597 5,504 7,396 10,355 8,917 8,857 11,480 
Labor Costs a 1,454 1,896 1,533 2,257 2,857 3,481 3,039 3,663 


















Value of Production 6,504 8,454 9,179 12,293 17,140 16,709 16,734 19,961 
Factor Shares of the Value of Production 
Value of Intermediate Inputs 45.2 45 • .6 40. 0 39.8 39.6 46.6 47.0 42.15 
Fuel, Electricity 8.. 1 7. i 6.5 6.5 6.5 7.5 7.6 7. 6 
Metals 0.5 0.5 0.4 
Construction Materials 0.1 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.4 o.4 
Chemical 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 o. 2 
Vehicles and Repair 















Tires 2.3 2.1 1.7 1.8 1.7 1.9 1.9 1.2 
Other .rndustrial Products 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.4 0.4 0.3 



















Other S ervices 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.5 0.6 1.6 1.4 1., 
Value Added 54.8 54.4 60.0 60.2 G0.4 53.4 53.0 57.S 
Wages and Salaries 22.4 22.4 16.7 18.4 16.7 20,8 18.l 18.I 
Payments to Government 

















Value ~~oduction 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
.,. 
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Table 9 continued: 
Note: 
aincludes estimates for the payment of direct taxes as well as indirect taxes 
taken from the national accounts. 
Source: Ivory Coast, Direction des Etudes de Developpement, Comptes de la Nation, 
Abidjan: various years; Ivory Coast, Ministere de l'Agriculture, Economie Forestiere 




Distribution of the Value ~f Intermediate Inputs and of Value 
Added in Cocoa and Coffee Production, 1960-1967 
1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 
Expenditures (Millions CFAF) 
aValue of Intermediate Inputs 6 , 098 ?,014 5,791 · 6,794 9,750 ... 8,927 10,968 6,111 
Fuels 20 26 18 32 36 32 38 24 
Fertilizer 25 27 29 31 32 32 33 34 
Pesticides, Insecticides 45 47 49 52 54 56 57 58 
Mechanical Equipment, TOols 64 66 70 73 77 79 81 82 
Bags 84 100 76 119 134 124 159 109 
Construction 11 11 11 11 12 13 13 13 
Decor:t:icaticn 562 706 480 882 990 875 1,053 644 
Transport & Commerce 5,287 6,031 5,058 5,594 8,415 7,716 9,534 5,147 
Value Added b 23,071 23,833 19,749 32,232 42,085 27,795 35,078 33,480 
Labor Costs 8,882 9,921 8,342 11,556 12,857 12,150 13,983 10,726 
Payment to Government
C 
2,731 2,688 5,976 10,134 12,509 3,202 6,492 11,745 
Residual (Profits, etc.) 11,458 .5,431 16,719 12,443 14,603 11,00911,224 10,542 
29,169 30,847 25,540 39,026 51,835 365722 46,046 39,591Value of Production 
Factor Sb.ares of the Value of Production 
17.4 18.8 24.3 23.8 15.4Value of Interm8diate Inputs 20.9 22.7 22.7 
0.1 0.1 O.l 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1Fuels 
O.l 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1Fertilizer 
Pesticides, Insecticides 0.1 0.1 Ov2 0.1 O.l 0.2 0.1 0.1 
Mechanical Equipment, Tools 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.2 
0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3Bags 
Construction 
Decortication 1.9 2~3 l.9 2.3 1.9 2.4 2.3 1.6 
Transport and Commerce 18.2 19.6 19.8 14.3 16.2 21.0 20.7 13.0 
Value added 79.l 77.3 77.3 82.6 81.2 75.7 76.2 84.6 
Labor Gosts 30.4 32.2 32.7 29.6 24.8 33.1 30.4 27.l 
Payments to Government 9.4 g.7 23 .3 26.0 24.1 8.7 14.l 29.6 
Residual (profits, etc.) 39.3 35.4 21'•3 27.0 32.3 33.9 31.7 27.9 
Value of Production 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Notes: 
aEstimates of the value of material and service inputs were obtained for 
each year by multiplying the ratio of this value to either tons of cocoa and 
coffee produced or hectares in production, as estimated by regional surveys 
for 1962-1964, times the quantities produced or area in production each year. 
To this was added the cost of transportation and commercial transactions after 
deduction for taxes paid and the net balance of stabilization operation. 
b200 francs per day multiplied by the estimated number of man-days used 
in production assuming 17 days for cocoa and 28 days for coffee required per 
hectare for tree maintenance and 50 days for cocoa and 150 days for coffee 
required per ton for harvest operations. These requirements are based on 
information gathered in a survey of the southeast area of the country conducted 
in 1963-1964. 
cincludes export tax estimates and the net flow of stabilization 
operations. 
Sources: Ivory Coast, Direction des Etudes de Developpement, Comptes 
de la Nation, Abidjan: various years; Ivory Coast, Ministere du Plan, Region 
du Sud-Est: Etude socio-econoruigue, Paris: Societe d'Etudes pour le 
Developpement Economique et Social, 1967; Ivory Coast, Hinistere du Plan, 
Region de Daloa-Gagnoa: Etude socio-economique, Paris: Bossard Uniter, 1967; 
Ivory Coast, Hinistere du Plan, Etude Generale de la Region de Han, Paris: 
Bureau pour le Developpement de la Production Agricole, n.d.; Ivory Coast, 
Hinistere du Plan, Etudc. Regi6nale de Bouake, 1962-1964, Abidjan: 1966; 
annual data on the numb..:,r of hecca.res of cocoa and coffee in production ob­
tained from the planning ministry of the Ivory Coast. 
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than that of timber. 
The remaining portion of value added is broken down in Table 11 
into an allowance for amortization, the net return to capital, and a 
residual rent. The return to capital for cocoa and coffee was calculated 
rather arbitrarily at 8 percent, but the results are not much affected by 
a change of a few percentage points in either direction. This is slightly 
lower than the average rate of return to capital in timber production, which 
averaged just under 9.5 percent for the eight years. 
Of greatest interest, perhaps, are the substantial rents to land 
devoted to cocoa and coffee production after deduction for the returns 
to all other factor services, In the Southeast, where Pl:"actically all 
rural families grow at least some cocoa or coffee, the average return to 
labor per hectare in 1964 was 14,300 francs per year. ~he average annual 
return to cocoa land for the entire nation 9 which is somewhat lower than 
that for the Southeast region, was 11,500 francs, If we consider only 
family labor valued at 8,100 francs per hectare in the Southeast in 1964, 
the return to land in cocoa actually exceeded that of labor, Returns to 
land planted in coffee were lower, and this is consistent with the general 
impression, confirmed by land use estimates, that farmers were tending to 
switc h'. h to cocoa during. tis pcrio.'d ao It must be remembered, moreover, 
that the rents to land shown in Table 11 do not include payments to govern­
ment but only that portion retained by the farmer. It seems clear, then, 
that by the mid 1960's good cocoa and coffee land was of considerable value 
to its owners. 
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Table 11 
Capital and the Distribution of Factor Returns in the Production 
of Timber, Cocoa, and Coffee, 1960-1967 
(milliorlS CFAF) 
1960 1961 1962 1963 1964
•'· 






































7,535 6,472 5,268 6,506 








































27,127 27,093 28,336 29,338 
9,900 10,800 11,624 12,240 


























































Coffee 1,378 1,303 1,337 1,368 1,523 1,563 1,576 1,597 
Residual Renth 7,366 7,466 1,469 6,444 12,297 7,907 9,946 6,350 
Cocoa 4,461 3,171 1,826 2,770 5,125 2,876 5,883 4,570 
Coffee 2,905 4,295 - 357 3,674 7,172 5,031 4,063 1,780 
Residual Rent per Hectare (CFAF) 
f.;c(:aa 16,22110,570 5,655 8,147 14,727 8,056 16,118 12,351 
Coffee 5,429 8,488 - 688 6,919 12,127 8,292 6,641 2,870 
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Notes: 
aBased on benchmark estimates obtained from a survey conducted in 1960 
and on the assumption of a constant ratio of capital to the volume of timber 
produced in subsequent years. 
bObtained as a residual after deducting estimates for amortization, 
direct taxes, and payments for financial services. 
cEqual to net profit divided by the capital stock. 
dEqual to productio'.:'1 valued in terms of prices paid to the farmer minus 
the value of intermediate inputs rurchased by the farmer. 
eSee Table 10, 
£Estimated from the imputed value at 200 francs per day of labor used 
in clearing, planting, and maintaining cocoa and coffee trees until they enter 
production, assuming that only one half of actual clearing costs are attribut­
able to cocoa and coffee, the remainir1g half going to food production which 
frequently is combined with the planting of cash crops the first year. Labor 
requirements were estimated as 180 days per hectare for cocoa and 161 days per 
hectare for coffee from the Southeast rural survey cited in Table 10. 
gStraight-line depreciation over 20 years for cocoa and 15 years for 
coffee. 
hObtained by deducting labor costs, amortization, and the return to 
capital from agricultural income. 
See Tables 9 and iO. 
The ckvelopnent of these exp0rts w-:1s not ')nly uf interest to African 
planters , it wc1s .=!.lso o. net g:=d.n to the whole economy. Ii- it is assumed, 
in accordance with our previ,,us discussion, th~t the social opportunity cost 
of all factors except land w~s equal to the prevailing factor price, this 
net gain was equal to the sum of Pc1yments to GcNernment nnd the Residual 
Rent received by cocon and coffee farmers. The rv.tic of the net g::dn from 
timber production tc the total value of this prcduction climbed from .107 
in 1960 to .171 in 1962 and reE1ained roughly constant t~epeaftcr. Fer cocoa 
an<l coffee, however, this net gain coefficient was much higher, averaging 
•383 during the entire peric,d with no cle2rly discernible trend. 
fm alternative way cf considering the net g2lin is to examine its 
importance relative tc the tot0,l anount of accumulated public investment 
in the Ivory Coast. Since much of this investment had as its effect to 
open up new -::ir<::2.s tc the expert tra.cle, the returns to gc,vernment and to 
land may be alternativGly viewed 'lS a return on this public capital. At 
the beginning of 1960 it h2.s been estimatecl th2,t the value cf this capital 
in terms (Jf the p1~.-tces of that yecr v;as 83. 7 billion CFf'l frCtncso 
that the 1960-1966 investment program was equally spread out over the next 
seven years, the value of the capital st0ck mJ.y be estimated for each year. 
The total net gain to thG economy from timber, cocoa and coffee production 
during this time 2veraged ;-,_bout 13 percent of the value of this accumulated 
investment. If only th2t part of investment which contributed directly to 
export expansion is inclu,:ed in th0 capital stock, that percentage is much 
higher--perhaps 30 to 40 percent. Thus it is cloar that the economic gains 
which directly resulted froi!l this investment were very important. 
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The employment and income resulting from these export activities, shown 
in Tables 12 and 13, differ markedly. Total employment in the timber industry 
in 1963 has been estimated as 16,636 persons of which approximately 45% wera 
Ivoirians. In the cocoa and coffee producing regions, on the other hand, there 
were about one million persons working in agriculture, spending on the average 
in the productionapproximately 40 percent of their time devoted to agriculture 
of these cash crops. Of these alMst 90 percent were Ivoirians. 
Other important facts are revealed by looking at incomes. First, in 
terms of absolute size coffee und cocoa generated substantially larger incomes 
than did timber, though being a relatively capital and skill intensive activity 
and employing fewer workers timber production paid each of them on the average 
substantially mo!'e than c1id cocoa an<l ccffee fal:'ming. The largest share of 
income, moreover~ went to the European owners and man2gers of these firms. 
Even total salaries N.,ceived by Eurcpeans we:r>e more than two-thirds as great 
as the wage bill paid tc Ivoirians ano equc.led 27 percent of total labor costs. 
Nonlvoirian Africans, though employed proportionately more in the lower skill 
grades tha.n Ivoirians, nevertheless r>eeeive:d almost as r.mch in total wages 
because of their greater numbers. In cocoa and coffee production, on the 
other hand, in addition to a larger total income, Ivoirians received by far 
the largest share of income from their l2bor, capital investment, and ownership 
of land. Non-Ivoiricm Workers, in fact, received only slightly more than one­
quarter of the total wage bill and 13 percent of total income. Because of lower 
skill levels and the seasonality of employment, however, each worker on the 
average received. substanti2lly less thar. did wor>kers in the timber, industry. 
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Table 12 
Distriibution of Employment and Income from Timber Production 
by OrigiA of Recipient, 1963 
Non-Ivoirian Non-
Ivoiriian African African Total 
Employment
a 
7,541 8,604 491 16,636 
Yearly Income (millions CFAF) 848 792 1,925 3,565 
Wages and Salaries
b 
848 792 613 2,253 
Net Profitc l,312 1,312 
d
Average Wage (CFAF/year) 112,451 92,050 1,248,472 135,420 
........ .. . . 
Share of Income(%) 24 22 54 100 
Wages and Salaries 24 22 17 63 
Net Profit 37 37 
Notes: 
aEstimated by averaging data 2hovn iri '!'able 16for 1961 and 1966
 and adjusted for under­
coverage as reported in the timber industry survey cited in Ta
ble 9. 
bEst~~ated on the basis of average wage rates by skill group, g
iven in the timber 
industry survey, and adjusted to the total wages and salaries s
hown in the national 
accounts for 1963. 
Since the vast majoriity of timber companies are owned by Euriop
eans, it wasCSee Table 11. 
assumed that all of net profits went to this group. 
dObtained by dividing estimated wages and salaries by the numb
er of employees of each 
category. 
Sources: See Table 9. 
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TABLE 13 
Agricultural __Employment, Proportion of Agricultural Time in and Distribution 
of Income from Coffee and Cocoa Production by Region, 1962-l9G4a 
Region 
Daloa-
~}_Ilployment (000s persons) 
Southeast G_afn0.-=i Man Bouake Total 
Heads of farm 99 84 72 71 326 
Family Workers 163 143 110 181 597 
Local Hired Workers 2 1 0 0 3 
Non-local Hired Workers 90 54 6 12 162 
Ivoirian 22 21 l 2 46 
Non-Ivoirian 68 33 5 10 116 
Total 354 282 188 264 1,088 
Proportion of Agricultural Time in 
corree ana l:ocoa ( '5 aa1rs ] .. 
Heads of Farm and Family 1-✓ orkers 50 46 19 12 32 
Hired Workers 84 81 80 74 82 
Yearly Income (million CFAF) 13,394 6,436 1,888 1,339 23,057 
liead.s or Farms ·•and Family Workers 10,735 5,307 1,752 1,062 18,856 
Return to Laborb 3,462 1,821 877 617 6,777 
Rents, Return to Capital, etc. 7,273 3,486 875 445 12,079 
Hired Workersc 2,659 1,129 136 277 4,201 
Ivoirians 694 439 22 46 1,201 
Non-Ivoirians 1,965 690 114 231 3,000 
Average Income per Recipient {CFAF/vear) 
HP-am:: ·of FAr>m. and F;:im'i ly WoY>h-'rii'.'. 
Return to Labor 






















~ents, Return to Capital. etc. per Hectare 
( Cl:'J\J:'1 na J 16,945 18,444 13,177 5,933 15,901 
Share of Income(%) 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Heads of Farm and Family Workers 80.l 82.4 92.7 79.3 81.7 
Returns to Labor 25.8 28.2 46.4 46.0 29.3 
Rents, Return to Capital, etc. 54.3 54.2 46.3 53.3 52.4 
Hired Workers 19.9 17.6 7.3 20.7 18.3 
Ivoirians 5.1 6.9 1.3 3.5 5.3 
Non-Ivoirians 14.8 10.7 6.0 17.2 13.0 
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Notes for Table 13: 
aData fo1~ the Man and Bouak~ regions were obtained in 1962-1963; all 
other data a.pply tc the season 1963- .l96'+. Output in each region was 
valued in 1963-1964 producer prices. 
bObtained by estima~ing the total return to labor, using the method 
described in the notes to Table 10, and subtracting the return to hired 
workers estimated on the basis of the observed number of days worked in 
cocoa and coffee. This is a slight over estimation of labor time spent 
by hired worker.sin current production since it is impossible to separate 
out the number of days devoted to the maintenance of trees not yet in 
production. Clearing and planting time, however, is not included. 
cThe distribution of the wage bill paid to Ivoirian and non-Ivoirian 
hired workers is based on the relative numbers employed in each region. 
Sources: 
Ivory Coast, Ministere du Plan, Cote d'Ivoire 1965: Population; 
Etudes Regional.es 1962-1965·-Synthese, Abidjan: 1967; regional surveys 
cited in Table 10. ··--· 
The regional variation in cocoa and coffee production is also 
striking. The Southe2.st area of the country has had the longest history 
associated with the.se cash crops and is the n:ost commercialized. There, 
21 percE:nt of the total labor force, including family workers many of 
whom devote only part of their time to agriculture,are hired from outside. 
In the Daloa-Gagnoa region, located in the center-west of the country where 
production has g1..,own most rapidly in recent years, 19. 5 percent of the labor 
force works for wages. Man and Bouake, in the western and central parts of 
the country, are more margin:o;_l areas of production an<l are less dependent 
on hired labor. Also indic2tive of the greater concentration of cocoa and 
coffee in the Southeast and Daloa-Gagnoa region is the higher proportion of 
agricultural time de·rnted to the::1e crops, especi2lly among heads of farm 
and family workers, who :J.re not hired pr5.marily for this work. 
As expected'. average incomes from cocoa 2md coffee decrease as one 
moves from the SouthEast toward thE n,3wer 2.nd more marginal regions of 
production. This is as true of the ret1.:rns to family labor as it is of the 
returns to capital and land~ The averaee income of hired workers in Daloa-
Gagnoa, however, is lower than in any other region, probably because hired 
labor is used for clearing and planting, activities which have been more 
important in this region in recent years than elsewhere but the wages for 
which are not included in the table. In the Southeast this income is 
higher than elsewhere since laborers are more likely to work all year or 
at least for a:o. entire agricultural season. 
Also interesting is the value of residual rent and the return to 
capital per hectare of 1and in production. In thG Southeast, where trees 
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in some areas are past their ::::,1,ime anc·. declining in yields, returns are some­
what lower than in Daloa-Cagnoa~ whe:r.e cocoa and coffee have been planted more 
recently. Clearly indicated~ too, is the marginal nature of the other two 
regions, especially of Bouake, where: 2.ftcr deduction for labor costs, returns 
per hectare are le~s than one third those of Daloa-Gagnoa. It is important 
to note, however, that Mhile Bo~ake is a mGrginal region in terms of land use, 
especially ontsjde of the southern part, coffee growers are nearly as well 
developed commer·cia.Ey as the farmers in 7he Southeast and in Daloa-Gagnoa, 
as evidenced by th·~ !1i6h slnre L1 t0tal inc:)me from ::ocoa and coffee of wages 
going to hired labor. 
IV. Linkage Effects 
Linkage e.ffects, defined as economic bcmefits and costs associated 
with the impact of ::xpo:i."t expansion c,n other secto:!'.'s of the economy, may 
result from inter•relationships in :)rc;duction, consumption~ savings, and 
investment. In 2. strict sense they should be valued net of opportunity 
cost, that is the net gain which arises from the exploitation of scale 
economies, externalities, the uce of unde~employed resources, or; from 
the national point of view, the attraction of capital and other scarce 
resources from abroad. In a. broader sense, however, the objectives of 
economic developsent may je multiple, anc linkage effects should be defined 
to include progress to,,rar·d ach5.evement of all goals. Even if there is 
no gain net of social. opportunity cost, fo:;:, ex-:imple, linkage effects which 
increase equality of incor.1e dL,tribution mc1y be desirable. 
It is also impo~t2nt to Gefine the concept of net gain over a rel­
atively long pe.11'iod c~ tiw.e. One 0£ the arguments ,?..ssoci2ted with the 
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desirability of industrialization is that long-term prospects are not good 
for the continued growth of traditional exports at a rate sufficiently 
rapid to stimulate sizeable increases in per capita income. In the Ivory 
Coast, for example, we have seen that the prospects for growth of exports 
of cocoa and coffee at a rate much faster than three percent per annum are 
poor and that supply constraints af:fectine; tir,1ber production are likely to 
become increasingly importatlt in the next few years. The current profitability 
of these long-establisted exports, however, makc:s it difficult, and not 
necessarily desirable, tJ un0ertake any large-scale reallocation of resources 
at present. Yet there m0 e a mu.1ber' c.f re;.-1sons why the current beginnings 
of restructuring the economy in the c.::.'..,act.fons of agricultural diversification 
and industrialization are import2.nt ., For onf: t}ifin~" although there appeax>s 
to be no underemployed rur0.l lalYJr during the busy season, there is a good 
deal at other time~ of ~he y8ar, The difference between the average income 
of unskilled workers in the timber industr7, which employs labor throughout 
most of the yea1-o, and that in cocoa and coffee pc>cduction is strong evidence 
of this. Severe difficultiee, mo1"eov3r, lie in the way of gainfully employing 
agricultural labor during the slack season because of the reduction of ef­
ficiency and high turnover costs involved. Onl:r through the development of 
a diversified range of activities will it h,e possible to provide year-round 
employment for the julk of the population and develop a modern, stable work 
force. Furthermore, althcJugh unemployment amcng unskilled workers today is 
31largely seasonal, in fu·-::ure years the spr8ac'. of communications is likely 
to result in an increased cl0marl0 for vear-round employment with resulting open 
unemployment if new jobs of this natu:c-oe are not crGated.. 
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Another reason for current efforts toward industrialization is that 
the Ivory Coast is a small country with a limited market, which, if it 
is going to have a substantial industrial sectorj must find export markets 
for its manufactures. Tc be competitive in world markets these goocswill 
have to be produced by c. labor force which is sufficiently skilled to satisfy 
demand for high quality 2nd low c.os•i.:. The development of those industrial 
skills in a popula~..:ion which i.s largely engag2d in agri~ulture is a major 
task which will require some 
The grm1th of industry in recent years has been extremely rapid, 
stimulated in part by libe1,al goY'>..lrnment investment incentives. So too has 
been the expansion of agriculturJ.J. products other than cocoa and coffee. 
Our concern here is ·to out.:i.ine some of ti.1e w3.ys in which this fast pace of 
industrialization ancl. divei:·sification, as well as the growth of the tertiary 
sector, has be.,m encouraged by the expansicn of the three main exports. 
A. Product.i.on Linkages 
The timber• ai.1C1 cocoa and cof:':ee secto·,:is mey gene1·ate linkages, 
either backward er for-ward 0 which incrcace cdpacity utilization or induce 
me-w investment in other sectors. backwarc linkages~· generated by the 
demand for intermediate inputs of goods and s~rvices, appear to be 
relatively weak for timb8r. Although t:1e sh,::.re of cst5.mated local 
purchases of t:bese inputs rose ::'rom 49 percent in 1960 to 79 percent 
in 1967, most of this was fox• tLe transportation of logs to the port, 
an activity which is conducted primarily by the timjer companies them­
selves and can be considered as being within the same enclave, though 
it does provide employment for a number of Africans. Aside from trans-
- 56 .. 
portation, the most important stimulus to backward linkage production comes 
from the demand for fuel oil for heavy equipment and trucks, which, since 
1966, has been refined locally. Capital expenditures are less likely 
to affect the local economy since equipment tends to be highly specialized 
and could not be efficiently produced within the Ivory Coast at this stage. 
Out of estimated capital expendit 1.1res of from 1. 9 billion francs in 1960 
to 4.8 billion francs in 1967, approximately 85 percent represented purchases 
from abroad. 
Backward linkages in the cccoa and coffes sector are even less important 
as a percentage of the tot-'11 value of production, as can be seen from a 
comparison of Tables 9 and 10, t 1lt their impact on tho local economy~ espe­
cially in the transporta.t::.on. a::i,'!. commercial sectors .. is probably greater. 
These sectors tend to bG muc1 1,'.:::,rs diffused, :i.nvol\/e a much larger number of 
Africans, and the returns to tuth capital 2nd lF:lbor are more likely to go to 
Africans, though not necessarily to Ivoi_rians, than is the case with timber. 
Of some importance 5 too~ is the decortication of coffee, much of which is 
performed by larger plantert> who have inves·ced in the necess2ry machinery. 
Of lesser importance is the stimulus given to the local manufacture of jute 
bags, pesticides, and insecti-::ides. Investment in tte planting of cocoa and 
coffee trees, because i~ is such a la.bor intensive activity, also contributes 
to African incomes, though the expansion of this investment was not as rapid 
during the 1960 's as it was a decade earl:i er'. Nevertheless, it is clear that 
the failure of most farme;.0 1:: tc use 3ubsta:rtic:,l amounts of purchased inputs 
has limited the backward 1:i.n]oge effe':!ts c:' these two crops. 
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Fo1:ward linkages, on the other· hand~ are much mo:.ce important, 
especially for timber. In 1954, as seen in Table 8, sales of timber 
to local sawmills and other processing installations accounted for 42 
percent of total production whereas processing of cocoa and coffee, aside 
from preliminary activities carried out in the village such as sorting 
and drying, was limi~ed to conditioning prior to export. By 1967, the 
proportion of local to total sales of timber tad fallen to 28 percent, 
but local processing of cocoa and coffee, extended principally to the 
manufacture of soluble coffee and the intermediate products~ cocoa butter 
and cake, accounted for six percent of tho total value of production and 
was expanding rapidly. It was envisioned that, by 1975, 30,000 tons of 
coffee would be processed annually, rmch of it from crops which would 
otherwise not be exportable, either because of poor quality or because 
markets could not be found. During the first years of production, as 
seen in Table 14, all of the cocoa butter and cake and about 80 percent 
of the soluable coffee was exported. 
Despite the relatively large quantity of timber which is processed 
domestically, the Ivory Coast does not appear to have a strong comparative 
advantage in exporting processed wood. Historically, the timber supplied 
to local sawmills has been of inferior quality or damaged in transit so as 
to be unacceptable for export, but since 1962 the government has required 
timber companies to process locally part of their production which would 
otherwise be exported as logs. In 1966 the tax laws w~re changed so as 
to provide a further incentive for local processing. The growth of the 
domestic market has not been as great as that of local production, more-
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TABLE 14 
Value of Production and of ~xports s,f_ 
Processed Timber, Cocoa, and Coffee, 1960-1967a 
(million CFAF) 
1960 1961 1962 1963 1961· l965 1966 1967 
Lumber, Plywood, Veneer 
Production 1,397 1,733 2,185 2,672 3,682 5,740 5,686 5,909 
Export 680 810 950 1,030 1,990 3,492 3,357 3,599 
Cocoa Butter and Cake 
Production 59 1,193 1,657 2,614 
Export 59 1,153 1,555 2,693 
Soluble Coffee 
Production 188 235 305 450 591 611 
Export 132 190 242 384 472 486 
Roasted Coffee 
Production 42 60 100 170 170 110 92 82 
Export 22 30 55 90 90 35 40 32 
a
Note: Production and export figures differ from year to year because of 
variations in inventories as well as domestic sales. 
Sources: Ivory Coast, Direction des Etudes de Developpement, Les Comptes de 
la Nation, Abidjan: various years. 
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ever, so that about 60 percent of locally processed timber has been exported 
in recent years, as compared to about 40 pe::-cent from 1960 to 1964. The 
study of the timbe:"' ind.ust0 y under:-ta.ken in the mid-1960s revealed, however, 
that exporting unprocassed logs was consider,ably more profitable and 
contributed more government revenue and foreign exchange than did primary 
processing. The latter activity~ in fact 0 was undertaken by timber companies 
primarily in order to satisfy the government's requirement. With the change 
in tax legislation in·l966) the private p:cofitability of exporting unprocessed 
logs decreased, but this d:i.d r_othing ·-::o increase the social bE:nefits derived 
from processing ths best timber' for export. Nevertheless, there may be a 
social gain from p~'ocessing associat~d with the acquisition of skills and the 
use of species which are not export2ble in raw form but can be used domestical-
ly or exportad to a limited extent as timber or plywood. 
32 
The exter.-e to which backwai'."d and ::_~orward linkages result in gains 
to the economy net of soci2l opportunity cost is difficult to evaluate 
quantitatively, but tl1esr; gains do not appea:o> to be very great. First, 
as we have seen, the linkages themselves are not strong, especially the 
backward.linkages excluding the transpor'!::ation sector. Forward linkages 
important in relation to the value of production, but value added, 
in the production of cocoa butter and cake especially, is not great and 
seem more 
timber processi.ng is achieved at the cost of some loss of efficiency in the 
allocation of cap: tal. Seumdly, where important linkages do exist, there 
are few economies of scale to be exploited in most of the linked sectors 
since the optimum scale of each establishment is, in most cases, well short 
of the demand or supp.1.y ,:;rsated by the 0;xport sector. There are exceptions, 
•.., 
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of course, such as petroleum and the production of jute bags, but they are not 
numerous. Thirdly, there do not appear to be any important externalities 
except those associated with the acquisition of skills and the advantages gained 
by agglomeration. From a distributional point of view, however, one of the 
important characteristics of the timber processing industry may be its dispersed 
character, providing some manufacturing employment in rural areas. Finally, 
these linked sectors use few, if any, otherwise underemployed productive factors. 
Cocoa and coffee transportation, wtich because of its flexibility is able to 
employ people seasona:ly, experiencas its greatest demand for labor at approxi­
mately the same time that workers are needed in agriculture. Management, 
capital, skilled labor, and even unskilled labor are imported from abroad at 
fixed factor prices in most of the other industries, while the one factor 
which is still underutilized, land, is not an importan't input. 
B. Final Demand Linkages 
In evaluating the linkages associated with the demand for goods and 
services resulting from the incomes generated in the export sector, we are 
disadvantaged by the difficulty of obtaining reliable estimates of the 
distribution of incomes ar:1ong savings, consumption of imported goods, 
and consumption of domestically produced goods. Budget studies in rural 
areas have been conducted, but these data are extremely difficult to 
estimate accurately. We can use estimates from the national accounts 
instead, but they apply to the entire country. Because of the pervasive­
ness of cocoa and coffee cultivation, however, the naticnal accounts 
estimates may be of some use along with various qualitative observations. 
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First of all~ it is clear that the impact on final demand of incomes 
generated in cocoa and coffee has been enormous. In 1960 agricultural 
incomes earned in the production of cocoa and coffee were 23 percent of 
Disposable Personal Income. Although this proportion had dropped to 18 per­
cent by 1966, a year more typical than 1967, cocoa and coffee incomes still 
rose by 40 percent during -these six years. Even given the leakages out of 
the income stream due to taxes, savings, transfers abroad, and expenditures 
on imported goods, the impact of this sector on total consumer demand must 
have been very important, 
In contrast to production linkages for which net gains seemed rather 
low, moreover, the gains associated with the expansion of demand are sul::­
stantially greater. In the first place, the total magnitude of the effect 
is more important because incomes gener1ated in cocoa and coffee production 
are three or four times the value of intermediate inputs plus value added in 
processing. Secondly, economies of scale whic~1 were relatively unimportant 
in production-linked local industries such as transportation, are much more 
extensive in the consumer goods industries currently in the process of import 
substitution. T~e sustained industrial expansion of the last decade has, in 
fact, been possible only because of the simultaneous increase in size of the 
domestic market,, Investmen-l.:s have frequently been made well ahead of the 
expansion of demand because capscity utilization rates tend to climb rapidly. 
It is worthwhile no-ting, too, that for purposes of market expansion it makes 
little difference whethe::' incomes a:c>e paid to Ivoirians or to other Af!'icans, 
except in so far as the .latter tr·ansfe:o part of their earnings out of the 
33country. Thirdly, the externalities associated wi-:h the agglomeration of 
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industry, urbanization, and the creation of a pool of skilled. labor are 
likely t~ have been important in the past, though they may be giving way 
currently to problems associated with congestion and too rapid a rate of 
rural-urban migration. Finally, there is the question of whether any 
underutilized factors have been brought into prod1..1ction or whether most 
factors have been imported from al:ro·ad o'.:'." reallocated from other sectors. 
Much of the expansion of the labm• force in industry, for example, has 
been achieved by non-Ivoirians. Nevertheless, it is prcbably true that 
many of these immigrants will continue to live in the Ivory Coast for years, 
and one should not distinguish too sbarply between African nationalities in 
assessing the benefits of expanded employment opportunities. Furthennore, 
the expansion of industry has increased the number of white collar jobs, to 
which many Ivoirians feel they are more suited by virtue of their education, 
and this has been a net social gain. In additicn, unlike most backward and 
forward linkages, the effects of cocoa and coffee production on final demand 
have included the smnll-scale manufccturing and services sector, which 
pres~~ably is more flexible in providing employment on a seasonal basis. 
It should be borne in mind, however, that a large part of industry 
is subsidized by the investment incentive program, by low interest rates, 
and by mildly protective tariffs. Although the investment incentives are 
supposed to be temporary, it is recognized that some firms are never likely 
to be able to operate without them, Since all these measures represent a 
cost to the consumer and to other sect8rs, any net gain is reduced according­
ly. 
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Most of these effects exist for the final demand generated by the 
timber industry as well, but the impact is much smaller. Salaries earned 
by Europeans, for example, are more likely to be transferred abroad or to 
be used to purchase imported goods than is the income earned by African 
planters. The higher proportion of non-Ivoirians in the timber industry 
also implies that a greater proportion of ,\frican wages Hill be transferred 
outside the Ivory Coast. Finally, most of the profits earned by European 
companies are either transferred abroad or used to purchase imported equip­
ment, whereas the profits of African farmers are more likely to be spent 
at home. 
It seems clenr that there are substantial savings ~y cocoa and 
coffee planters, but they are difficult to measure because of a certain 
amount of secrecy and the tendency to hoard savings as cash rather than to 
place them in banks or 9ostal savings accounts. There are also wide 
fluctuations with changes in yearly income. Nevertheless, there is sub­
stantial evidence that planters, in addition to expanding the area of 
cultivation, have been able to finance the construction or purchase of 
schools, home improvements, agricultural implements and small machinery, 
vehicles, and, in some cases, urban houses. Some of these investments, 
such as purchases of taxis or rental of houses, have been for business 
purposes. In recent years savings have also been used to finance diver­
sification into other agricultural products such as oil palm. 
There is little information concerning the rate of savings. The 
regional study of the Southe&st in 1964 estimated the savings rate as 
15'percent of family income, but failed to include a number of investment 
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expenditure items.as part of savings. The national accounts estimates of 
all personal savings are about 8 to 10 percent of Disposable Personal 
Income, but it is recognized that this is a residual item which contains 
all the errors of other estimates. In any case, it seems clear that, in 
addition to forced saving from government taxation, there is a substantial 
amount of voluntary saving as well. 
C. Technological Linkages 
There have been a number of external economies associated with 
the production of timber, cocoa, and coffee. One of the most important 
has been the construction of feeder roads by timber companies and African 
planters for the evacuation of their products. These roads have later 
served as transportation routes for a variety of purposes. In sparsely 
populated areas of the country, immigrating Africans have often estab­
lished their villages along the roads previously built for the transpor­
tation of felled timber. Among the gains resulting from this improved 
transportation network, aside from the effect of a reduction in the cost of 
transport, are increased competition among commercial traders at the 
local level and greater aecess to agricultural extension services, health 
facilities, and schools. 
In addition to roads, transportation vehicles and commercial net­
works established primarily for the export trade are available during the 
off-season for other tasks. Historically, the network supplying imported 
goods throug-Jiwut the year frequently coincided ,-dth that set up for exports. 
Although these networks tend to be more distinct today, there is still 
• • 
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substantial overlap, with some equipment and personnel employed in 
both sectors. At the same time that these two directions of trade 
have reinforced each other, however, their lines of communication have 
been such as to inhibit internal exchange. 
In the same way that the development of linked industries has 
helped to build up a pool of skilled labor, so have timber, cocoa, 
and coffee contributed directly to the acquisition of skills available 
for other uses. Truck driving, road building, md tree clearing are 
of the skills employed in the timber industry which have applicationsome 
elsewhee. The African planter, as he becomes increasingly commercial. 
by planting new l.J.nd and hiring labor~ develops entrepreneurial abilities 
that can be applied to a variety of enterprises, nona~ricultural as well 
as agricultural. 
To some extent the external economies described here influence 
h • 1 34relative prices and are thus pecur..ary rat.er than technologica • 
Skills general to several fields may be acquired in the timber industry, 
for example, through apprenticeship prog:r•ams in which wages received 
are lower than those of unskilled wor.kers so that the apprentice, in 
. . 35 
effect, pays for his avm training. 
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Given a perfect capital market and no uncertainty, this is a socially 
efficient situation. In the absence of knowledge concerning the gen­
erality of skills, however, employers will pay for at least part of 
the cost of training, and some underinvestment will occur. In either 
case adjustment of the distribution of costs and benefits is achieved 
in the lifetime pattern of wages and depends on the degree of uncertain­
ty concerning the future usefulness of training. In the absence of 
a capital market, on the other hand, wages which are already low cannot 
be depressed,much further, and er::iployers thus must pay nost of the 
cost of training even if everyone is aware of its future value. 
The difference between technologic2.l linkages~ in which free 
benefits or costs are transferred between firms or households, and 
precuniary economies or diseconomie:s, in which benefits and costs are 
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valued in the market but are unanticipated at the time of making invest­
ment decisions, is prirr.arily a question of the degree of perfection of 
markets. Pecuniary ecor..omies or diseconomies arise because the durability 
of physical capital ar:d the locational specificity of land imply that 
decisions made at a point in time unde:r·conditions of uncertainty will 
generally result in unanticipated gains and losses in dt!:he-''.ature. As long 
as markets function smoothly~ however~ these gains and losses can be valued 
and soldo Thus if a perfect market existed i.'or timber land and if it was 
unanticipated when a purchaser acquired some of that land that the feeder 
roads built by timber corr.panies would be useful, he would experience an 
immediate capital gain as soon as this fact became apparent. After that, 
however, other land owners would bid against each other, driving down the 
rents paid by timber c<'."mpa.nies until they a::•e compensated for the addition­
al capital t11ey cr8ate. In the absence of ·'l market~ on the other hand, 
timber companies mi~hT continue for some tirr.e providing free roads to 
new settlers, but to a lesser extent than would be socially optimal. 
Pecuniary anct especially technological 
are likely to be quite important in the Ivory Cc:astat this stage because 
of the long durability of infrastructure, because of the importance of 
locational speci~icity in a sparsely populat:ed country whose transportation 
infrastructure .is still far from completely developed, because of the 
uncertainty which is so prevalent, and because mar•kets are often poorly, 
if at all, organized. The existence of important pecuniary effects may 
call for government planning anQ other efforts to reduce uncertainty, but 
· . .es · · Technol ogicalthey doAnot necessarily require government inte~vention. 
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externalities, on the other hand, !11ny bo in conflict ~,ith various government 
objectives and cannot usually be co~rected without some form of policy action. 
Thus it is important to try to distinguish between these effects and to estimate 
the impact of technologice.l externalities on social objectives such as growth 
and equity. The expansion of timber, coffee, and cocoa in the Ivory Coast 
has, in balanc~favore<l growth by providing skills and transportation infra­
structure especially, but the lack of well developed markets for land and 
capital indicate that government intervention is needod to gain full advantage 
from these investments,_. The distribution of benefits, moreover, has been 
much wider for cocoa and coffee than for timber, but both sectors have favored 
the southern over the northern half of the country. 
D. Fiscal Linkages 
Some of the most important effects of the expansion of timber cocoa, 
and coffee production have taken place vi2. the fiscal system. All of these 
exports have contributed in an important way to government revenues, as can 
be seen in Table 15. The receipts from cocoa and coffee have been especially 
important in years in which stabilization oner2.tions favored the gove:n.thlnt. 
Although these funds were received primarily for stabilization purposes during 
the first part of the period, in recent years an increasing proportion has 
been allocated for develop~ent. Of greater importance as a consistent source 
of revenue from coffee and cocoa, however, has been the export tax, which 
provided more than twice the resources contributed by the tiraber industry 
until the new tax laws regarding that industry becane effective in 1967. 
Nevertheless, the greatest expansion of revenue has been that derived from 
timber, the result both of the expansion of production and of a steady 
increase, since the early 1950 1s, in the rate of taxation. 
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TABLE 15 
Pavments to Government from the Production of Timber and 
Cocoa and Coffee, Total Government Rev~µues, 
aud Govei:..l.llent furylus on Current_Acccent, 1960-1967 
(million. C:FAF) 
1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 
Payments to Government 3,430 3,671 7,549 12,?.24 15,550 6,240 9,368 15,169 
Timber 699 983 1,573 2,090 3,041 3,038 2,876 3,424 
Indirect Taxes 432 650 .1. ~027 1,379 1,920 2,562 2,384 2,476 
Direct Taxesa 267 333 S46 711 1,121 476 492 948 
Cocoa and Coffee 2,731 2,688 5,976 10,134 12,509 3,202 6,492 11,745 
Export Taxb 5,285 6,38G 5,451 6,307 7 ,35l, 6,985 7,122 6,543 
Stabilization 
Operations -3, ,_54 -3,698 + 525 + 3,827 + 5,155 -3,783 - 630 + 5,202 
Total Government Revenut-"! 28,0CO 35,000 39,000 46,000 56,000 57,000 60,000 67,000 
Government Surplus on 
Current Account 5,000 7,COO 13,COO 16,000 22,000 14,000 17,000 17,000 
Payments to Government of 
Timber, Cocoa and Coffee 
as a Percentage of Total 
Government Revenue (%) J.2 10 19 ?.7 28 11 16 23 
Notes: 
aEstimated as a proportior. of total production and of net profits 
using coeffir.ients cal~ulated for 1963. 
bEstim~ted by multiplying the equivaleut specific tax rate times 
the quantity of experts. 
Sources: See Table 9 and Appendix Table. 
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In addition to the direct contribution of timber, cocoa, and coffee, 
averaging 18 percent of total govern~ent revenue fr0m 1960 to 1967, their 
impact on the r'est of the ecor.omy has strengthened -t:he general tax base. 
More important at this stage, the foreign exchange earnings of these exports 
have permitted irr.port.s to g.l"ow rapidly, and it is import duties which are 
the most importE.nt single source of taxation, averaging nea.rly half of the 
total. As a}:·result~ tot2l revenues ir..:::,re than doubled during this period 
and enabled the government "::o ope:."'ate with a substantial surplus, used, in 
turn, to finance capital expenditures. Out of o.bout 93 billion francs 
in public investment, including th"".t of public corporations, between 1960 
and 1966~ the Ivoirian public sector w2.s ablt:: to finance about 82 percent, 
the rest coming from for•eigD. aid., Of i:his total, 18 percent went to general 
administration, 11 pe1.0 cent to education ancl health, 12 percent to agricul­
tural develo:9ment, an-:". 46 p'3rcent to ecm1omi.c infras tructl,re such as trans-
portaticn and elect0~icity gener&tion. f::,om 1967 to 1970, on the other hand, 
the Ivoiri2.n g0ven:ment financed only 55 percent of public investment, 8 
percent going to administration~ 9 pex·cent to education and health, 26 per-
cent to agricu.ltu.re, and 45 percent to economic infrastructure. 
0112 que:stion which has caused considerable debate is the desirability 
of an export tax or of a stas-ili:;ation fund acting as a fiscal agent.
36 
It 
is generally held that this tax is e2_sily administered and may .increase 
savings if the goYernment is inclined to save and invest more than producers 
but that it destroys incenti'Jes and does no·;: have the most desiPable dis­
tribution Gffects. ?or the Ivory Coa2t until the late 1950 1 s, however, th'e 
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export tax may have been particularly appropriate and preferable, in some 
ways, even to a land tax~ which though frequently suggested as being ideal 
from a theoretical point of view is much more difficult to administer. 
Because of the very elastic supplies of all factors of production except 
land, the export tax has, fa~le""lil primarily on land and probably to a much 
lesser extent on local capital. It differs from a land tax, however, in 
that it is not the value of land which is assessed but the value of the 
37
produce which that land yield.s. Better land pays more taxes per hectare 
than poorer land, but, since other costs per hectare do not vary propor­
tionately with output, the residual rent net of taxes must be higher on 
. d 33better t han on poorer i.an .. This was seen em:rirically earlier in comparing 
these resicluals for different regions of the Ivory Coast. 
One 13ffect of th€ <,:X.port tax~ then, is to keep marginal areas out of 
production. This is h::~ld -to be '1.r,sirable by the Ivoirian government because 
of uncertain market5.ng pr()spects for cocoa and coffee and the durability of 
capital invested in these trees. Instead, areas which would otherwise be 
planted to cocoa and coffee can be devoted -:o o:ther crops, such as cotton, 
rice, or oil palm. This, in fact, has been the case in the 1960s under the 
joint influence of lower prices and sustained government taxation. One 
possible 'disadvantage, however., is the. effect that the tax has on agricultur­
al techniques, since it serves to discourage production on the intensive as 
well as on the extensive margin,, If, as some people believe, agricultural 
modernization is more likely to be achieved under conditions of intensive 
cultivation 3 the tex may :10.ve aD ad"erse d•:::velopmen+2l impact. 
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From a distributional point of view, the export tax is not as 
desirable as a land tax, though it may be more attractive than some 
other forms of taxation. In particular, a properly administered land 
tax could siphon off all the rent to land, leaving the return to labor 
and capital, which would be more evenly distributed geographically. On 
the other hand, an export tax does have the advantage of hitting harder 
les'S·· 
the richer farmers as a group, while farmers cultivating~profitable 
crops pay less taxes. Thus the tax is largely proportional rather than 
progressive among cocoa a~d coffee planters, though in the rural areas 
at least it is progressive relative to taxes on other sources of income. 
To the extent that savings and capital investment depend on the tax rate, 
however, it may be desirable to avoid too progressive a tax system. 
V. Contributions of Factors Production 
Until the end of Hori.d War II, growth in the Ivory Coast was 
constrained by twc interrelated factors. First, the difficulty of 
obtaining foreign capital and the limited domestic resources of the colony 
severely inhibited the developernnt of transportation infrastructure and 
prevented the three principal exports from growing at more than a relative­
ly moderate pace. Agricultural research might also have been accelerated 
if more capital had been available,but, given a moderate level of capital 
investment, the results of this activity were probably related more to time 
and to the skills of those in"o::.ved than tothe amount of financial resources 
available. At any rate, by the mid-1930s most of the research and experi­
mentation had been done which set the stage for later expansion of these 
exports. Secondly, the constraints on the supply of capital, together with 
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the existence of an important group of European planters and managers 
anxious to obtain cheap labor, led the colonial government to institute 
policies designed to force Africans to work either without compensation 
or at low wage rates. As a result of attempts at evasion and of the 
failure to communicate to large number of Africans ~he advantages 
potentially to be gained by working in the Ivory Ccast, the supply of 
unskilled labor during the prewar period was inadequate to sustain the 
magnitude of growth which occurred af1er the war. 
Following ilorld War II both of these constraints were dramatically 
eased. By the late 1950s the large amount of public investment as well as 
spreading knowledge of profitable opportunities resulted in supplies of 
unskilled labor and private foreign capital in the form of direct invest­
ment which were, as an approximation, perfectly elastic with respect to 
price. Foreign exchange either came with the imported capital or was 
obtained from export earnings. Until the 1960s, :furthermore, ,·imports were 
dominated by consumer goods, and it was only with industrialization that 
imports of capital goods and intermediate products became important. Al-
though tariffs helped to lessen the demand for imported consumer goods, 
there were few direct controls on trade, especially after exchange controls 
39 were lifted in 1958. Repatriation of profits was without restriction 
except in so far as firms were required from 1962 to contribute modestly 
to the repayment of the public debt unless they reinvested a certain 
proportion of their profits within the country. Givan the rapid expansion 
of exports and foreign aid, as well as access of European owned firms to 
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overseas sources of p:Pivate ca:?ital, thE:refore, foreign exchange does 
not appear to have been a constraint on gNwth during this period. 
The ciief constraints appear, instead, to have been the rate of 
inflow of public capital, to a lesser extent the availability of private 
capital in rural areas, and the absorptive capacity of the Ivory Coast 
to undertake investment projects. The latter was substantially lessened~ 
by the ability to purchase the services of skilled manpower from external 
sources. Although the cost of this manpower was relatively high, the 
profitability of investment in this potentially rich country, which had 
been for so long frustrated by lim:'..ts on the supply of public capital, 
was such that skills were readil:r imported. By the mid-1960's ·it was 
estimated that there were Rpproxirnately 30,000 Europeans living in the 
Ivory Coast. Despite this, l1owever, tn0 organizational difficulties 
involved in sustaining a very high rate of investr,ent were such that 
absorptive capacity 111ust at times have be0n the chief constraint on 
growth. Furthermore, the demands for Africanization since independence 
have applied increasing pressure to avoid this particular- solution. 
To assess quantitatively the relative importance of these constraints, 
it is useful to examine some of the variables suggested by Chenery and 
Strout as being important indicators.~0 During the period 1946 to 1960 
the real value of public investme:at in the Ivory Coast grew at an 
41 average annual rate of 10 percent~ We have no figures on private invest-
ment during this period, but it is unlikely tha"c it grew more rapidly, 
except perhaps for the planting of cocoa and coffee trees, which are not 
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included in the national accounts estimates fo1.., the_ 1960, s 
O During the first 
eight years of the next decade public investment continued at about the same 
pace, averaging a 9 percent annual rate of growth, but pr•ivate investment 
expanded more rapidly at about 19 percent per year for the first five years, , 
leveled off during 1966 and 1967, and then renewed its previous pace during 
the rest of the dec=i.de. On the average, total gross investment increased 
annually at about 15 percent during 1960 to 1965 and about 12 percent during 
the entire first eight years of the J_960' s. For a period of over 20 years 
this is a high rate of sustained investment growth, and occasionally the ab­
sorptive capacity const~aint ~ust ·have b~e~ effective especially during the first 
-half of the 1960's. 
When thi_s constraint was not binding, growth was dependent on the 
rate of inflow of public foreign capital and on the ability of the country 
to generate its own public and private savings. Once invested, these helped 
to create the profitable opportunities which induced the inflow of private 
foreign capital. In 194-7 about 75 pe:ecent of public investment capital came 
from foreign sources. By 1960 this figure had fallen to 28 percent, while 
for the public investment program of 1967-1970 45 percent of the capital 
came from foreign sources, but, unlike the 1950's, mcst of this was in the 
form of loans rather than grants. The marginal savings rate, defined as 
the ratio of the increment of Gross Domestic Savings exclusive of net 
capital inflows to the increment of Gross Domestic Product, was equal to 
.17 from 1960 to 1967. Since this is slightly less than the ratio of 
total investment to GDP~ the indication is that the Ivory Coast, still 
substantially dependent on foreign capital inflows to finance a large 
part of its rapidly expanding investments~ is likely to remain so for 
some time. 
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Foreign exchange,.on the other hand, is not at present a binding 
constraint. The marginal import ratio of .30 from 1960 to 1967 was about 
the same as the average ratio of imports to GDP during the entire period. 
About one half of these imports, moreover, were consumer goods, many of 
a luxury variety. Since consumer goods have not declined substantially as 
a proportion of total imports and since the import ratio is ~igh and roughly 
constant, the foreign exchange required to purchase capital and intermediate 
goods must have come from the expansion of exports and from inflows of 
capital. Exports, in fact, increased even r1ore rapidly than GDP at the 
same time that there were, on balance, substantial capital inflows, all 
~f which financed not only imports but substantial remittances and repatriation 
of profits. Should capital inflows be reduced, this would have an im-
mediate effect on investment, but foreign excha~se shortages could be avoided 
for a time by policies aimed at reducing the demand for imported consumer 
goods. Nevertheless, in the long run it is expected that the demand for 
imports of capital and intermediate goods will increase and that foreign 
P-xch;:mgA P.i'll"ningR m1rnt: grow rapidly enough to pay for these as w::sl l ;::,,:: f',..,,,, 
the repatriation of profits and wages and a moderate growth of consumer 
goods imports. At present, however, the outlook for continued rapid 
expansion of traditiona1 exports is not promising and whether new agri­
cultural products and manufactured goods can successfully take up the 
slack remains to be seen. Furthermore, the Ivory Coast is handicapped 
in one way by its membership in the West: African Monetary Union, which 
prevents its use of a policy instrument which may become increasingly 
needed: the exchange rate. Consequently, it is important to see wha1 
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has been the net effect on foreign exchange earnings, as well as on the 
supply of skills and capital, of the expansion of timber, cocoa, and 
coffee in the past. 
A. Skills 
Because of the high cost of importing human skills from ahroad and 
because of the desire of Ivoirians for an increase in the pace of African­
ization, it is important to examine the contribution which the export sector 
has made to the acquisition of skills. We have alw~ady made reference~to 
skills acquired in linked industries and to those earned in the export 
sector but applicable elsewhere. Here we are concerned only with the 
magnitude of the skills of Africans associ2ted directly with export produc­
tion. 
Estimates of the number of employees in the timber industry by 
skill level and by ori,1sin is giv2n in Table 16 for 1961 and 1966. Al-
though the number of firms sampled comprised virtually the entire industry 
in 1961, the sr-;mpie was not expanded with the growth of the industry and 
thus it seriously underestimates the number of employees in 1966. Never­
theless, these data probably are not ser·iously biased as far as the 
distribution of employment is concerned. Of interest, for example, is the 
relatively large number of workers who are at least semi-skilled. As a 
rough measure of the value of those skills, these workers earn on the average 
perhaps twice as much as unskilled workers. Even the latter earn sub­
stantially more per year than do agricultural workers, who during the early 
1960 1s averaged about 25,000 francs per year. Although this partly reflects 
the greater seasonality of labor in agriculture, it also results from a 
Table 16 
Number of Employees ani Wages in a Sample of Timber Firms by Skill Level 




Non- I vo i1~ian Non-Ivoirian 1963 
Ivoirian African Non-African Ivoirian African Non-African (CFAF/Year) \ 
Managers 2 3 60 5 3 80 1,500,000-
Supervisers & 
Techr.icia:ms 1 3 121 2 0 120 2,200,000 
Foreman 53 40 43 29 16 154 300,000-
ClericJ.l 226 73 26 233 186 56 800,GGCJ c---
(X) 
285 3 96, r:co-Skilled 370 104 0 3G7 
Semi-8killed 1,246 282 0 1,104 1,611 0 192,100 
Unskilled 3,912 4,073 0 2,116 4,598 0 60,COO 
Apprertfoe 359 157 0 100 111 1 72,0C'O 
a
Note: Does not include fringe benefits or bonuses. 
Sources: Ivory Coast, Office de la Main d'Oeuvre, Statistiques, Abidjan: various years; Ivory Coa.st, 
~ ,II-., A ... 
Ministere de l'Agriculture, Economie Forestiere de la_Cote d'Ivoire, Paris: SocietP d'Etudes pour le ,. 
Developpem€nt Economique et Social, 1967. 
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lower rate of labor turnover in the timber industry and a greater acquistion 
of skills even on the part of "unskilled" labor. 
42 
The second important feature of Table 16 is the increasing importance 
of non-Ivoirian Africans, especially in the more skilled positions. Although 
in 1961 these workers were concentrated predominately in the unskilled category, 
by 1966 substantial numbers had moved into higher categories, being even more 
numerous than Ivoirians in semi-skilled work. The number of E~ropean foreman 
also increased markedly, whereas the number of Africans filling this position 
dropped. This might be the result of the increased demand for talented Africans 
created by the expansion of industry, but there is no direct evidence. 
The composition of the labor force in cocoa and coffee production was 
previously given in Table 13. Although the numbers involved in this sector are 
much greater than those working in the timber industry, the average annual 
returns to labor, and prchably the skills as well, are considerably less. 
Above the unskilled level, the market appears to value much more highly the 
skills and supervisory talents associated with timber production than it does 
the entrepreneurial capabilities of the average cocoa Mnct r.offee planter, 
especially when it is acknowledged that much of the residual income ac?"Uing 
to heads of farms from these agricultural activities is a return to capital 
and to land use. Nevertheless, the acquisition-of skills in cocoa and coffee 
production cannot be ignored because of the large numbers involved and 
because, in contrast to timber~ of the predominance of Ivoirians, as heads 
of farm and family workers especially. 
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In addition to those employed at any single time, a large number 
of Africans have acquired skills in these activities and have later left 
to pursue other employment. Furthermore, for every three hired workers 
currently employed in cocoa and coffee production it is estimated that 
there is one person not currently employed but who is likely to return 
at some time in the future. The seasonal nature of agriculture, more­
over, implies that skills applicable to other activities may be utilized 
during the off season. If it is assumed that all workers and heads of 
farm have available 250 working days per year, then, out of a total df 
272 million man-days available far work, perhaps 200 million man-days 
may be devoted to activities other than the production of cocoa and 
coffee. Although there is no way or measuring the value of the net ad-· 
ditiOn to the supply of skills, the relatively high turnover rates of 
labor and the relatively short busy season in agriculture imply that the 
potential is great if these skills have any important usefulness out­
side of the export sector. 
B. Investment Resources 
The investment resources generated or imported by the export sector 
are shown in Table 17. For sake of completeness it was assumed that 15 
percent of agricultural income from cocoa and coffee production, after 
deduction for estimated wages paid to hirsd workers, was saved, but it 
is recognized that this proportion is little more than a guess. For 
the timber industry, the only net savings are those going to government 
since all profits are assumed to be repatriated abroad. i\t the same 
time, however, capital investment, even if it actually took the form of 
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Table 17 
Investment Resources Generated or Imported by Timber, 
Cocoa and Coffee Producers, 1960-1967 
( .rrtillions CFAF) 
1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 
Timber 
Resources Supplied 2,618 3,009 6,002 6,652 5,100 7,218 8,243 
Capital Inflowa b 1,919 2,026 3,912 3,611 2,062 4,342 4,819
Payments to Government 699 983 2,090 3,041 3,038 2,876 3,424 
Resources Used 
Gross Investmenta .. 1,919 2,026 3,088 3,912 3,611 2,062 4,342 4,819 
Net Contribution 699 983 1,573 2,090 3,041 3,038 2,876 3,424 
Cocoa and Coffee 
Resources Supplied 5,230 5,290 7,563 12,785 16,207 6,193 9,977 14,390
Gross Savingsc b 2,499 2,602 1,587 29651 3,698 2,991 3,485 2,645
Payments to Government 2,731 2,588 5,976 10,134 12,509 3,202 6,492 11,745 
Resour-eQs ·used ·· a 
Gross Investment 1,609 2,833 2,697 3,984 2,712 2,396 2,417 n.a. 
Net Contribution 3,621 2,457 4,866 8,80113,495 3,797 7,560 n.a. 
Notes: 
aEstimated from the difference between the value of the capital stock in 
successive years plus amortization. 
bSee Table 15. 
cEstimated as 15% of total agricultural income~ from cocoa and coffee after 
deduction for wages paid to hired workers. It was assumed that these represented 
the same proportion of total labor cost in each year as in 1962-1964. 
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a reinvestment of earnings, is treated as a capital inflow from abroad which 
is used entirely by the timber industry. The generation 
of investment resources in the form of savings by cocoa and coffee planters, 
on the other hand, does not necessarily equal investment, and, in fact, is 
frequently greater than that investment, leaving a sizeable quantity of 
resources available for investment in other sectors. 
The importuee of the particular form of investment resources generated 
by the export sector must be emphasized. While the Ivory Coast has had ready 
access to private foreign capital in the form of direct investment, its supply 
of public investment resources has not been unlimited, but instead has been 
the chief constraint on growth over the past twenty years. Nor have African 
farmers had unlimited access to capital via the banking system or other lending• 
institutions. The high cost of obtaining information concerning prospective 
borrowers in rural areas and the resulting uncertainty concerning their 
prospects for repayment have effectively shut off this source of funds for 
long-tem investment purposes. Thus the generation of savings by the export 
sector has been of considerable importance in helping to overcome these two 
bottlenecks to development. 
C. Foreign Exchange 
The net contribution of foreign exchange resulting from the production 
and export of timber, cocoa, and coffee is shown in Table 18. This contribution 
is derived by estimating various items both in tems of local currency and 
foreign currency. In the first case, the balance of payments impact is 
measured by subtracting from the sum of payrr.ents to government and other 
local payments the proc8eas from local sales, which do not involve foreign 
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Table 18 
Balance of Payments Impact of Timber, Cocoa and Coffee 
Production and Export, 1960-1967 
(million CFAF) 
1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 
A. Local Currency 
Timber 
·p a:h ayments to Government 











- Proceeds from local sales -468 -571 -744 -874 -1,158 
Balance of Payments Impact 3,750 4,886 4,965 6,897 8,835 
Coffee and Cocoa 
+ Payments 
a 
to Government 2,731 2,688 5,976 10,134 12,509 
+ Other Local Paymentsb 26,203 27,896 19,331 28,598 39,011 
- Proceeds from local Sales - 17 - 23 - 82 -117 -173 
- Additions to Stocks -642 -493 +4,450 -3,143 -4,248 
.:Balance of Payments Impact 28,275 30,068 29,675 35,472 47,099 
B• Foreign Currency 
. Timber 
Balance of Trade 2,904 4,194 4,J34 5,759 9,584 
+ Export Sales b 6,036 7,883 8,435 11,419 15,982 
- Imports of Materials -1,491 -1,950 -1,771 -2,330 -3,297 
- Imports of Capital Goodsc-1,6#1 -1,739 -2,630 -3,330 -3,101 
Balance of Invisibles -1,073 -1,334 -2,157 -2,774 -4,360 
- Imports of Servicesb -3 -4 -7 -10 -15 
- Net Factor Income -1,070 -1,330 -2,150 -2,764 ..:4,345 
Paid Abroaa.d 
Balance on Current Account 1,831 2,860 1,877 2,985 5,224 
Balance on Capital Account
e 
1,919 2,026 3,088 3,912 3,611 
Balance of Payments Impact 3,750 4,886 4,965 6,897 8,835 
As a% of Export Sales 62.l 61.9 58.8 60.3 55.2 
Coffee and Cocoa ., 
Balance of Trade 28,275 30~068 29,675 35,472 47,099 
+ Export Sales b 28,733 30,331 29,956 35,834 47,509 
- Imports of Materials -:2?5 -263 -233 -294 -315 
- Imports of Cocoa -223 - 48 - 68 - 95 
Balance on Current Account 28,275 30,068 29,675 25,472 47,099 
Balance of Payments Impc:.ct 28,275 30,068 29,675 35,472 47,099 
as a % of Export Sales 98.4 99.l 99.0 98.9 99.I 
1965 1966 1967 
3,038 2,876 3,424 
9,463 10,276 11,488 
- ..'..l, 721 -1,900 -2,125 
10,780 11,252 12,787 
3,202 6,492 11,743 
33,227 39,239 27,580 
-902 -1,217 -2,213 
-192 -5,080 -348 
35,335 39,434 36,764 
10,427 9,182 12,024 
14,988 14,834 17,838 
-2,732 -1,930 -1,676 
-1,829 -3,722 -4,138 
-1,709 -2,272 -4-,056 
-37 -41 -75 
-1,672 -2,231 -3,981 
8,718 6,910 7,968 
2,062 4,342 4,819 
10,780 ll,252 12,787 
71.9 75.8 71.6 
. ,."' 
35,335 39,434 36.764 
35,628 39,749 37,030 
-293 -315 -266 
35,335 39,434 36,764 
35,335 39,434 36,764 
99.2 99.2 99.2 
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Table 18 Continued: 
Notes: 
aSee Table 15. 
bEstimated from the value of intermediate goods and services in each product
class from Tables 9 and 10 and ~ the proportion imported of the total available goods
and services in each class. Other Local Payments also includes value added net of 
payments to government 
cAll equipment was assumed to be imported and all construction was assumed to 
be domestically produced. 
dNet profit plus amortization from Table 11. 
eGross investment from Table 17. 
Sources: Ivory Coast, Direction des Etudes de Developpement, Les Comptes de la
Nation, Abidjan: various years. 
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exchange transactions. These net local payments are the counterpart of the 
foreign currency earned from exports and capital imports minus the sum of 
expenditures on imports of intermediate goods and services and capital 
goods plus net factor income paid abroad. National accounts estimates of 
the proportion of available goods and services imported in each of 26 
product classes were used to estimate the division of total expenditure on 
intemediate goods and services into imports and local purchases. A more 
complete analysis would also have included the indirect expenditures on 
imports of local firms furnishing goods and services to the export sector, 
but the extent of aggregation and the unstable nature of input-output 
relations in the Ivory Coast economy at this early stage of industrialization 
are such that this exercise was not considered to be worthwhile. 43 Even 
the estimates of direct expenditures on imports by the export sector may not 
be very accurate because of the heterogeneous nature of the various product 
classes. 
The table does, however, indicate the important contribution of 
foreign exchange made by these exports. Virtually all of the exchange 
earned from exports sales of cocoa and coffee go to local factors of 
production. While the balance of payments impact of timber sales has been 
less important, it has increased much more rapidly than has that of cocoa 
and coffee. Furthermore, it has also increased as a percentage of export 
sales, rising from 62 percent in 1960 to 72 percent in 1967. This has 
been partly due to increased purchases of locally produced materials, such 
as fuel oil, and partly to the increased rate of government taxation. The 
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inflow of capital to this industry has also consistently been greater than 
the outflow of profits, reflecting the high rate of gr~wth of timber production. 
In summary, the balance of payments impact of these traditional exports 
has been the major reason for the lack of a binding foreign exchange constraint 
during the past 20 years. In order to furnish the foreign exchange necessary 
to continue its rapid rate of growth the Ivory Coast must find new export 
products which not only can be expanded rapidly but which also will not require 
too high a rate of growth of imported inputs. Since many manufactured products 
today are produced using fairly capital intensive techniquesand requiring a 
high proportion of imported intermediate goods 1 it may be difficult to generate 
a rapid growth of net foreign exchange earnings by exporting these products. 
New agricultural exports~ on the other· h.and, require fewer imports in their 
production, and, if they can be expanded rapidly, should contribute more 
to the balance of payments. 
IV. Conclusion 
The expansion of timber, cocoa, and coffee exports has been viewed 
here as an example of ''vent-for-surplus 11 growth. Thc productive factor 
most abundant in supply with very low opportunity cost in the early years 
was land, but in order for land to enter into production for export, there 
had to be developed a knowledge of agricultural possibilities and a trans­
portation infrastructureo Local labor, available from leisure time or other 
productive activities, was sufficient to initiat6 cultivation but not to 
sustain the expansion which ensu0d during the post-World War II period. For 
that, a labor market developed, relying upon workers migrating from the 
north. Private capital and hur0,an skills wero also impcrted, Gspecially 
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from Europe, to ec1se other potential ccnstraints. 
On the d0mctnd siclc tho Ivory Coast bcnefitted, in onG way, from its 
delayed develor::uent. Hhereas in Ghanc1. much of the best cocoa land had 
already been planted by the,.1S30 1s, in the Ivory Cea.st at that time this 
process had just begun. When tho depression arrived and cocoa prices 
plummeted, planters in the Iv0ry Coast sh~fted easily to coffee, enjoying 
the benefit of 2 protected mar:<et in France. During and after the war the 
expansion .:_)f this market was rapid, too, due tc the neccss i ty, because of 
exchange restrictions, for Fr2.nc8 to rely on colonial coffee. The con­
straints long imposed on the devel,Jpment of the timber industry, preventing 
the Ivory Coast from exi::loiting thi.s resource at a time when world market 
conditions were not w.:::11 developed., have also resulted in greater diversi­
fication today. 
The: period of rapid e>:pansion of those traditional exports is, how­
ever, nearing an end. 1-luch of the best coco2. and coffee land has already 
been planted, and the stock of currently marketable timber species is such 
that some of these will be app1-:oaching exhaustion vdthin a. decade if their-
exploit.:2tion is net slowed. Cocoa is also subject to highly unstable world 
prices, and, shouJ.d a.n effective international accord be reached to sta­
bilize those prices, the growth of prod11ction will be limited to about 2. 5 
percent per year. Ccffee exports, already subject to an international 
agreement, are limited tc, ::tn annual growth rate in "traditional markets of 
about 2. 2 percent. Though more rapid expans.i.cn of the coffee market is 
expected in E2..stern Europe and Japan, the absolute size of these markets 
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is such that they will not be important to -:he Ivory Coast for many years. 
The contributions which these exports have already made to Ivt;irian 
development have been considerable. The net gain directly obtained in the 
form of payments to government and the residual rent to cocoa and aoffee 
farmers has been high--13 percent of total accumulated public investment. 
Cocoa and coffee have accounted for the largest share of this net gain, 
but timber production has increased its share rapidly from 6.5 to 15.9 
percent. Cucoa and coffee have, in addition, not only generated more 
employment and mere income than ha.s timber, but these have gone in much 
greater proportions to Ivoirians, On the other hand, important regional 
inequities have also resulted. Hhereas per CB;pita income in the southern 
part of the country averaged 49,000 francs in 1965, three-quarters of it 
in monetary form, income per head in the north was 18,600 francs, of which 
only 5,400 francs were rs;ccived as c2..sh, the r8st being imputed- sub­
sistence production. The ultimate solution to this problem of regional 
disparity is seen partly as migration towards the richer areas of the 
south and partly via the introduction of new commerci2l crops in the north. 
Aside from direct contributions, the production of these exports 
has generated linkage effects throughout the rest of the economy. Although 
backward and forward linkages in production do not appear to be very 
important, those resulting from increases in final demand have been enormous, 
especially for cocoa and coffee. Most of the expansion of the Ivoirian 
economy has, in fact, depended upon them. Technological linkages have also 
probably been important, especially the construction of feeder roads and 
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acquisition of skills, but the value of these is impossible to measure 
quantitatively. The combination of direct and indirect payments to 
government resulting from the production of the export sector, further-
more, has enabled the Ivory Coast government t~ finance a large part of 
its own investment program, which has been heavily weighted in favor of 
economic infrastructure but has also incre,:::..singly been directed toward 
agricultural development. In addition, the growth of taxes on exports and 
imports about the time of independence permitted the government to·shift 
towards a more modern tax structure, yielding relatively low revenue at 
4present but whose base is expanding rapidly with the growth of the econorny.~ 
The contribution of the export sector to the total supply of pro­
ductive factors has also been important. African workers in the timber 
industry have acquired skills of gre2.ter d,;pth, but those learned in the 
cocoa and coffee sector have been diffused much mc1'Eo broadly, and, to the 
extent that they are transferable, may be employed during the slack season. 
Investment resources generated or imported have been slightly more important 
for cocoa and coffee than for timber 3 but the latter sector has channeled 
an average of 31 percent of value added toward the important public invest­
ment sector, a percentage which has bC;en growing rapidly, whereas this 
,._p,m,tion of value added in the production of cocoa and coffee has oscil­
lated widely around a~1 average of 22 percent with no clearly discernable 
long-term trend. Cocoa and coffee, however~ have contributed to sc~rce rural 
savings used for a variety of investmonts while the profits from timber 
have generally either been repatriated abroad or reinvested within the 
industry. Production of cocoa a~d coffee has also contributed more to 
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foreign exchange earnings, both absclutely and as a proportion of export 
sales, though the net contribution of timber has grown more rapidly. 
As this phase of rapid growth of these traditional exports is 
coming to an end, the Ivory Ccastgovcrnment has ndopted a program of 
agricultural diversification and industrialization designed to re­
structure the economy and expand its export base. Although the growth 
of exports is expected to slow somewhat, it is not expected to fall 
below 6.5 percent before 1980. To take up the slack resulting from the 
slower growth of unprocessed coffee, coco2 and timber, exports of 
canned pineapple and pine2.pple juice, canned fish, coco2 butter, soluble 
coffee, vegetable oils, raw cotton, paper pulp, textiles, and iron ore 
are expected to increase rapidly. Since th2se prcducts are based on 
locally produced raw mate::'.'ials, they require fewer imported inputs and 
thus avoid one of the difficulties, nctcd earlier, associated with 
export of manufactured products. 
Most of the domestic raw materials goir..g into tbese industries 
t·1ill be the result of the 2.gricultu1"')al diversification program i-1hich is 
the 
takingadvantage of,,Ivory Coast 1 s favorable national endowment and rich 
45heritage of researct. Past experience indica~es strongly the importance 
of this broad base of local research in developing new agricultural 
products. Where this experience may not be of much help·, however, is in 
showing how new techniques can be spre.c1.d from experiment station to 
farmer. In the past, expansion has occurred over empty land using the 
most extensive techniques. Today muc:.1 of that land has a relatively high 
opportunity cost in terms of the cocoa or co::'fee which may be grown. 
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Future expansion will have to come increasingly from shifting to more 
highly valued crops and raising yields. This will require a continuous 
flow of information between farmers, researchers, -c:.nd suppliers of 
agricultural inputs which has not existed in the past. To develop its 
extension services, the government has for several yearsbeen active in 
a variety of pilot programs designed to introduce new crops or improve 
techniques. Success has varied, but the real test will not come until 
these programs are expanded to encompaEs most Ivoirian farmers, thus 
placing a greater strain on their administration. Twenty-five years 
of rapid export growth has contributed the resources required to place 
the Ivory Coast economy firmly on this more difficult path of sustained 
development. Whether, in fact, t:1e p2th will be attained depends now 
only on the wisdom and skill of the Ivoirian leaders. 
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FOOTNOTES 
1All the informution and data in ::his essay for which sources are not 
indicated are ts.ken f.r,)m ·i:his a.m:hor I s forthcomir1g book on the Ivory Coast 
economy. 
2Annual data CL the quantity and v~lue of timrer? cocoa, and coffee 
exports and on t1:ie value of toto-tl exports fo:r th8 period 188?.-1970 are given 
in the appendix. 
3 see Robert E. Paldwin, Ec0nom::.c DeveJ~rc.ent ·md Export Growth; A Study 
of Northern Rhodesia, :9~.Q--1960_, Bc:;:kefoy, C&l:Lfornia.: University of Califor-
nia Press? 1966, for a d>sc1:ssion o:i:: thec-e cha;: 1cter:i.stics. 
4The locnl colonial gov:rnmsnt c0ntinu8d t, pursue this goal until 1915 
in the western par-:: o;: the r,•ory Cca3t, wher·,' fierce resistance to colonial 
rule was encounter,d ~ tbu~ dive·::-t:.i_ng r:ubF ::antial resources a·way from develop­
ment in the east. 
5
construction o:f the raih·o['.d pass-3d ot:t of the forest region into the 
savannah in 1910, having ~ttained a dist~nce of 182 kilometers. 
6
ouring the inter-war period the expansion of transportation facilities 
was severely constrc'.ined by lack of pu.bli~ ca.pitc::1. In Fc:·ance the demand for 
capital for reconstrnc·::ic.m following World War I and, later, the collapse of 
the capital market, dui:; tc infh.tion followed by the ctepr.:;ssion., effectively 
shut off that source. The French W0st Afric.:on government was thus dependent 
on its own resources, whic:1 ,;;·,:,r~ very meagre b~ce.use of t::1e lack of an adequate 
tax base. This situation was d:u:,o.-'11:::_c;:.llly n~versed in th;; 1950 1 s as the French 
began to pour large ·1mot.tnt::: of f:Lna..iciaJ. 3.ia i-r:cto the~e:'llpire. 
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7The following table gives some idea of the evolution of the road network 
in the Ivory Coast since 1947. In addition, the condition of many roads was 
markedly improved. 
Total Length of Roads in the Ivory Coast 
(kilurneters) 
Year Paved Unpaved 
All-Weather Seasonal 
1947 50 3,616 7,227 
1956 350 8,370 
1967 1165 20,803 
Source: Ivory Coast Territory, Service de la Statistique, 
Inventaire Eeonorn:ique dela Cote-d 1'IvoiJ:,e (191+7 a 1956), 
Abidjan: 1958; Ivory Coast Repu'.)lic, J.iinistere du Plan, 
Premie~e Esguisse du Plan Quinquennal de Developpement 
1971-1975, Abidjan: 1968. 
8This contrasts with cocoa e}:pe:rimentation in Ghana from the first half 
of the nineteenth century. That Ghanaian cocoa planting expanded rapidly from 
the early 1890's while no such similar expansion took place in the Ivory Coast 
until the 1920 1 s suggests that the length of time required for local testing 
and experimentation before a crop is profitably grown may be measured in terms 
of decades. As will be seen, this hypcthesis is strengthened by the experience 
with coffee in the Ivory Coast. 
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9six French agricultural research institutes 9 each specializing in a 
different type of crop, and the relatively extensive research facilities of 
the Ministry of Agriculture form the backbone of this infrastructure. 
lOEster Boserup 9 The Conditions of Agricultural Growth; the Economics of 
Agrarian Change under Population Pressure 9 Chicago: 1965. 
11Buell~ for example, notes that in the mid-1920's about "thirty per cent 
of the fifteen or twenty-thousand laborers employed in the forest industry in 
the Ivory Coast desert after being recruited." (Buell, The Native Problem, 
Vol. II, p. 31). It is interesting to note, in contrast, that African planters 
paying higher wages similar to those paid by cocoa farmers in Ghana seemed to 
have no difficulty in obtaining labor. 
12During the 1930 1 s it was estimated that about 80,000 workers migrated 
annually to Ghana from Upper Volta. Estimates of the numbers recruited for 
work in the Ivory Coast vary, but the number probably did not exceed 10,000 
per year during the same period. 
13The Chamber of Agriculture around 1950 estimated that 190,000 laborers 
were required in the Ivory Coast, of which 28,000 were needed by European 
plantations at harvest time. 
14
Between 1952 and 1959 this organization financed the recruitment of 
150,000 workers. During the same period at least 500,000 non-Ivoi:m.ansmigrated 
at least once to the Ivory Coast. 
15
It was frequently said that French manufactures tended to be unsuitable 
for a mass, low-income market in contrast, for example, to British textiles. 
- 104 -
16Two exceptions, to be discussed shortly, were coffee and cocoa. 
17Throughout this essay the term Franc Zone will be used to denote 
France and all of her overseas departments, territories, colonies, and ex­
colonies which are bound with her into a customs union, allowing for non­
preferential fiscal duties, and the free interconvertability of currencies. 
1~uch of the description and analysis concerning the implication of the 
Ivory Coast's associate membership in the EEC is taken from Roger Lawrence, 
"Primary Products, Preferences') and Economic Welfare: The EEC and Africa," 
in Peter B. Kenen and Roger Lawrence, The Open Economy, Ne,:;,- York: 1968. 
19France, itself, is an exporter of hardwoods, though some Ivory Coast 
timber is imported for special uses. 
20This price was maintained despite the excess of Franc Zone cocoa produc­
tion over French consumption because of the creation of a special tax of .9 
francs per kilogram of cocoa exported to France from her colonies with an 
exemption for those who expo~ted an equal quantity to countries other than 
France. The price of cocoa in France in 1934 was about 25% greater than the 
average price on the New York cocoa market. 
21This amounted to almost two-thirds of the F.O.B. price. 
22
Whereas in the period 1929-1933 colonial coffee accounted for only 6% 
of French imports, that figure had risen to 32% by 1935. 
23The Ivory Coast quota for the 1959-1960 season was 83,000 tons and for 
being 
1960-61 it was 93,000 tons. This was almost equal to the quantitiesAexported 
to these two countries. 
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24The economic characteristics of the Ivory Coast described here are 
taken from a reclassification of the national accounts for the years 1960 
through 1967 undertaken by the author in order to put them in a form comparable 
to that recommended by the United Nations until recently. Access has not yet 
been gained to estimates made for later years, but the inclusions of these 
estimates would not substantially modify the results. For reasons to be sug­
gested later, moreover, the period up until the last few years of the 1960's 
is that which most interests us here. 
250 · · h f E'uropean personne1 wh.ich existe. d i notherne constraint int e use o 
industries, pressure for Africanization, was much less important in the timber 
industry because Europeans working in timber camps were relatively inconspicuous 
and because the demand on the part of Ivorians for this work ·was not great. 
26It will be shown shortly that tb.e amount of rent which did not accrue 
to the government does not appear to have been very great. 
27Hla Myint, 11The 'Classical Theory' of International Trade and the Under­
developed Countries," Economic Journa:i., vol. 68, June i958, pp. 317-37. This 
concept refers to the possibility of achieving high rates of growth of output 
as land and labor with very low opportunity costs are reallocated to the pro­
duction of exports under the impact of the opening of the country to foreign 
trade. Once these factors are completely absorbed in the export sector, the 
vent-for-surplus period of growth comes to an end and further increases in 
output can be achieved only by increasing the supplies of productive factors, 
including capital, or by improvements in technology. 
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28rt may be argued, in fact, that the Ivory Coast was very fortunate in 
the timing of its expansion of coffee especially, taking advantage,as it did, 
of the foreign exchange shortage in France following the Second World War which 
forced France to shift her coffee consumption away from the arabicas of Latin 
America. The dependence of the Ivory Coast on the French market then pressured 
France into supporting Franc Zone coffee prices during the late 1950's and 
early 1960's, and this, in turn, was a major reason for the sizeable assistance 
granted by the European Development Fund to compensate for the dismantling of 
these supports within the EEC. 
29Actual rates vary according to conditions of employment, origin of 
worker, and region of production. The rate of 200 francs includes an implicit 
valuation of food and lodging and may be compared with the legal minimum wage 
in 1964 of 178 francs. It is generally recognized that workers on African farms 
receive higher wages than do unskilled workers in the modern part of the rural 
sector, who might be expected to receive the legal minimum wage, but employment 
is more seasonal. On balance, it seems that 200 frRnr~ pPr day is, if anything, 
an overestimate, especially if the opportunity cost 0£ family workers is less 
than that of hired labor. 
30
nuring the period 1960-1967 the estimated number of hectares producing 
cocoa increased more than twice as rapidly as the number producing coffee. 
This is especially noteworthy because coffee can be grown in many areas in 
which cocoa cannot. 
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31This is not to say that there has been no open unemployment in the Ivory 
Coast but that most of it has been related to a rise in aspirations for some-
thing better than unskilled manual labor. Although employment of people with 
these higher aspirations in jobs suitable to their skills is desirable, this 
objective would not seem to take precedence over that of providing everyone 
with at least some kind of work throughout the year. 
32Because on virgin tropical forests are made up of mixed species rather 
than homogeneous stands of timber, several privately unprofitable trees must 
usually be cut down in order to get at the most valued species. Since the 
market for timber land is very undeveloped: and since timber companies retain 
concessions for relatively short periods of time, the only cost to the companies 
of cutting down unprofitable trees is that involved in the felling process 
itself. From a social point of view, however, the di.scounted present value of 
those trees if they were saved until export prices were higher at some time in 
the future is their opportunity cost, and it may be greater than the private 
cost of felling them today. By requiring firrna to process a certain proportion 
of cut timber and then sell to the market at a loss, the government is causing 
them to absorb part of this opportunity cost to the benefit of the Ivoirian 
consumer. This is not the most efficient solution, however, since this cost 
is imposed in the felling of profitable species as well. 
330ne mig. h t even ask wI1ether the Ivoiriar;,phenomenon of attracting whole-
sale immigration is not a politically and economically more viable solution for 
the small size of most African markets than is the painful and difficult road to 
economic integration. 
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34Tiber Scitovsky, 11 Two Concepts of External Economies," Journal of 
Political Economy, LXII, April 1954, pp. 143-51. 
35Gary S. Becker, "Investment in Human Capital: A Theoretical Analysis, 11 
Journal of Political Economy, LXX, Supplement: October 1962, pp. 9-49. 
36Gerald K. Helleiner, Peasant Agriculture, Government, and Economic 
Growth in Nigeria, Homewood, Illinois: Irwin, 1966, pp. 178-84. 
37The value of land may be related to geography as well as to climate 
and soil conditions. Since cocoa and coffee are paid everywhere the same 
price, this is not an important consideration for these crops, though it is 
very important for timber. 
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where pis the price of output X, tis the tax rate, and c is the cost per unit 
of input L. L enters the production function directly and L is that part of1 2 
input L necessary to maintain each unit of land at a constant level of quality. 




The marginal product of Lat the intensive margin just equals the marginal 
product of Lat the extensive margin, and both are equal to real factor price. 
Other things equal, better land implies a higher value of the marginal product 
of L
2 
, though in equilibrium more land on the margins of cultivation is kept 
in production so that the marginal product of L2 is everywhere the same. The 
value per hectare of the intramarginal rents, however, is higher on better land. 
Note that if the price falls or the tax rate increases, output has to be 
reduced at both margins to regain equilibrium. 
39These were controls placed by the Franc Zone on exchange transactions in 
other currencies, there being no controls on currency exchange within the Zone. 
During the late 1960s exchange restriction;were reimposed and lifted several 
times, but this was solely due to the international mcnetary crisis of that 
period. 
40Hollis B. Chenery and Alan H. Strout, 11 Foreign Assistance and Economic 
Development," American Economic Review, LVI, September 1966, pp. 679-733. 
l,,..,
-•:i.All growth rates, the marginal savings rate, and the marginal import 
ratio were obtained from linear trends fitted to time se.ries. 
4 ·2rhe difference in the value of skills is not nearly as great as the 
difference in annual incomes, however, since workers in the timber industry have 
substantially less leisure time than those working in agriculture. 
4 
3r.nput-output tables are estimated in the Ivory Coast each year on the 
basis of an annual industrial census but are used as a framework for the national 
accounts rather than to establish a set of parameters describing inter-industry 
relations. 
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44 .E. Eshag and J. Richards, "A Comparison of Economic Developments 
in Ghana and the Ivory Coast sincG 1960, 11 Bulletin of tho Oxford University 
Institute of Statistics, December 1967, pp. 353-71. 
45In addition to the historical record noted earlier, Evenson and 
Kislev have collected data.on scientific :nan-years which .indicate that the 
Ivory Coast in 1967 spent more time in agricultur1:1l researci1 tha.n any other 
country in sub-Sa.har2n Africa except Nigeria, Rhodesia, South Africa, and 
possibly Kenya. On 2 per c:.1.pita basis r:;;search in the Ivory Coc'.st clearly 
exceeded all countries except South Africa. See Robert E. Evenson and Yoav 
Kislev, "Investment in Agricultural Research and Extension: A Survey of 
International Data," Center Discussion Paper No. 124, Economic Growth Center, 
Yale University, August 1971. 
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2E,890 54,190 6,675,000 38,140• ,·1 ;•_ ) 7~,3][) 55 ,'150 6,149,000 35,140 59,540 
13,770,000 78,680
61H,300 3,533 9,129,000 52,160. I -_ l 50,170 6,172,000 17,480,000 '39,880-~ 2·/ t -:Jo '.;n,r::oo 5,256 71,690 7,881,000 
3S,270 64,100 10,G20,000 C0,580 18,810,COO 107,500
,~ _,' .':r 121.,:~oo l ,Lil1 .,OCO s,731 
45,080 50,420 8, 91,7 ,ooo52,700 8,833,000 50 ,4711 51,120 19,080,000 109,000-l 88,290 16,'JllO,OOO 96,800 27,310,000 lSG,100
I l'~ SS 160,400 1,273,000 7,274J. '.' ,, 75,200 11,058,000 63 ,19(1:' 111 ,coo l ,;:G'/ ,000, 7 ,2110 a11 ,BOO 11,960,000 GB,34075,750 B,405,000 25,580,000 145,20019 7 2G3,000 1,948,000 11,130 66,500 6,318,000 
'tB,030 118,700 15,130,000 86,l!GO 26,3110,000 150,$00lS .J l;0:!_,200 36 ,10(1 101,200
l 'J ·..,,) 
3,316,000 17,130 t16 ,330 Ei ,1115 ,000 
13,960,000 79,770 24,1130,000 139,GOOl;:.:1, ~'CO 11,0:JO,OOO 15,320 
33,14(1 112,500 18,780,000 97,02063,260 10,610,000 ll2,98(• 104,700 
31,1+90,000 1G2,700
16,000,000 64,820::- ~~ 33,820,000 137,000,-. : :; , G,)'.) (;, ::1;2 '000 25,690
l :':'•::l 70'?..,GJQ 8,336,000 33,770 
62,870 8,732,000 35,370 147,500 18,680,000
l<JC:-2 88,470 9,816,000 39,77( 
75,670 38,800,000 157,200915,100 9,282,000 153,800 20,l.74,000
lSC3 
37,600 101,000 10,550,000 42 t 7lf0 
81,720 47,120,000 190,900l,lSS,COO 12,450,000 142,600 18,930,00050,430 99,730 76,690 47,690,000 193,2001:::::.~ l'):;26,GCO 17 ,SGO ,OOO 11,280,000 45,690 182,100 24,470,00072,350 124,300 14,530,000 58,860 99,130 56,820,000 230,200204,300 31,720,000 123,500:..·::::::; , ~_--,G., 000 18, 1,70,000 
74,500,000 301,800
7!f ,fl?O J?S,4()() 1n,q10,ono 41\, ?fl/),SC.:.>,GOQ 13,590,000 75,310 lf>5,7'l0 ?5,8')0,000 1011,800• . -r 124,300 13,140,000 68,420,000.,_ ..,Jv I ~ ,840,000 21,7UO,OOO 53,230 181,500 30,230,000 277,200:·:::c J 2,1'76,000 25,800,000 
88,230 105,200 13,880,000 56,23( 149,000 25,420,000 
122,500 76,660,000 310,600
1S60 2 ,f,'J5,000 3S,120,000 
104,500 121,500 19,420,000 7P.,F.7(. 2111,400 35,860,000 
103,000 80,300,000 325,200135,200 118,900 26,350,000 101,500 
145,300 101,, 900,000 1125,0()()178,300 30,170,000 116,200 118,223,000 425D2C0J..:}7-: .:~ ,r::.:]7 ,coo 29,330,000 105,600 143,200 26,740,000 96,290 195,300 43,170,000 155,400 130,190,000 468,800 
.7"_':: ,~ 
- 11'+ -
Notes Values in US$ were calculated by dividing values in 
CFA francs by official exchange rates or annual means of free market rates 
when no official rates existed. 




du Commerce, Paris: various years; France, Agence Generale 
des C6lonies, Renseignements Generaux sur le Commerce des Colonies Francaises, 
Paris: various years; France, l'Agence Generale des Colonies, Bulletin, Paris: 
various issues; Cros, Louis, L'Afrique Francaise pour Tous, Paris: 1928; French 
West Africa, Agence Economique, Bulletin Mensuel de l'Agence Economique de l'Afrique 
Occidentale Francaise, Paris: various issues; Ivory Coast Territory, Service de 
la Statistique, Commerce Exter±eur de la Cote d'Ivoire et de la Haute Volta de 1931 
~: 1954, Abidjan: 1955; Ivory Coast Territory, Service de la Statistique, Inventaire 
Econornique de la Cote d'Ivoire, 1947-1956, Abidjan: 1958; Ivory Coast, Service de 
la Statistique, Inventaire Economique et Social de la Cote d'Ivoire, 1947-1958, 
Abidjan: 1960; Ivory Coast, Direction de la Statistique, Bulletin Mensuel de 
Statistique, Abidjan: various issues. 
